<영문자료>Korea's Military(6)

게재일   8806 현재위치   6/6 출 전   월조 조 회   1755   Korea's Military(6)

25. Alleviating Discontent about Promotion Delays. As Minister O pointed out, officers put a very high value on honor. The concrete ｅxpression of honor is military rank. Army organization begins and ends precisely in rank. Promotion management, therefore, is the key to effective military personnel management and even to effective military operations. Many officers maintain that serious anomalies in the officer personnel management system could trigger military rebellion. Retired KMA colonel Han Yong-won, a professor at Kyowon College has said, "The 16 May 1961 Military Coup was related to Pre-KMA Class 8's dissatisfaction with a promotion lag, the 12 December 1979 Incident was related to delays in promotion for KMA officers. Most the Pre-KMA Class 8 officers were lieutenant colonels on 16 May 1961, and had been trapped at that rank for six or seven years. Yet men of essentially the same age and who were commissioned only a year or two earlier either in the Pre-KMA Class or through the interpreter officers' Course were already major generals and leadership generals. one reason so many Pre-KMA Class 8 officers jointed the 16 May Coup was their dissatisfaction with their stagnated promotions." At the time of the 12 December 1979 incident, then colonel U Kyong-yun was a leader of the team sent to arrest CSA Chong Sung-hwa. Yun later retired as a major general. In 1979 he served as the Joint Investigations Headquarters' Chief of Investigations and simultaneously Army Headquarter's Criminal Investigation Team Chief. Just days before the 12 December Incident, Chon Tu-hwan tipped off Colonel U that he had been passed over for brigadier general. At the same meeting in which he communicated this intelligence, General Chon also asked for Colonel U's cooperation in Chong's arrest. one of the first things that U said to General Chong as he took him into custody was, "Mr Chief of Staff, I hear that I was passed over. I feel bad about that." That same night a certain colonel who was on officer in President Choe Kyu-Ha's Presidential Security Force but whose sympathies were with General Chon severed President Choe Kyu-Ha's communications with the outside world. This colonel had also been passed over for brigadier general, in his case as the result of the direct intervention of Chong Sung-hwa with the promotion board. After the 12 December incident, this colonel rose to the rank of full general. Virtually all of those who supported General Chong Sung-hwa on the night of 12 December 1979 were general commissioned in Pre-KMA Class 10 and earlier, while virtually all those who supported General Chon were KMA graduates. After 12 December, general officers commissioned in Pre-KMA Class 10 and earlier classes were hustled out of the Army in bunches, clearing the promotion bottleneck and allowing bulk promotions for KMA officers. This removed from the Army the residue of promotion discontent that was the root cause of the 12 December Incident. "In the Korean military" writes Professor Han Yong-wong, "a promotion logjam seems to occur about every ten years. one occurred in the early 1960s, and another about a decade later, although Korean Army participation in the Vietnamese War solved that one. The 12 December Incident served to blast loose the next logjam, ten years later. Some real thought must be devoted to preventing another of these recurring promotion logjams." The abolishment of the Yushin Recruitment System will cause a serious lag to develop in the time it takes to find a retiring officer to find a civilian job. The Minister of Defense is moving to solve the problem, increasing by three to five years for each grade the mandatory age at which on officer must retire, although this will require amending the Military Personnel Law. Three time-related restraints face officers serving in the military today. An officer may not serve beyond a set time-in-grade, a fixed time in service, or a certain age. When an officer reaches the first of these three limitations, he is required to retire from the service. In the case of colonels, the time-in-grade limitation is nine years, time-in-service is 27 years, and age is 50. under the new MND plan to ease the age limitation, a colonel's age limit will be extended to 55 from 50, and for leadership colonels to 50 from 47. Some people worry, however, that the extension will cause stagnation at the field grades, delaying promotions perhaps severely enough to cause another logjam. After the 16 May Coup and 12 December Putsch, a number of officers who played key roles in support of insurgent forces were rewarded with promotions. This is a major source of irritation for some retired officers. In 1980, for example, Kwon Chong-tai, Ho Sam-su, Ho-Hwa-pyong, and Yi Hak-pong, the so-called inner core of reformist leaders, were promoted to brigadier general several years ahead of their classmates, and days later were retired from the Army. Such men are called "three-day generals." Awarding "tombstone promotions" for unofficial purposes makes a mockery of the sacresanct military ranks. This alone is enough to upset the established hierarchy, according to one very angry retired officer, who adds, "Medals should be given as rewards for meritorious service, not promotions." 26. The Military's Relative Decrease in Importance. Bangladesh political scientist Tarukto Maenirujaman(FBIS: phonetic) classified 61 military coups according to the length of time that the coup forces retained power. During the period 1946 to 1984, Korea came in 23rd place. Of those 36 years, Korea was under military government a total of 23 years, or 63.9 percent of the time. First place went to Taiwan with 100 percent military government during those years; second place to Thailand with 89.5 percent; and then, in order, Nicaraugra and EI Salvador at 86.8 percent; Algeria with 86.4 percent; Egypt with 84.2 percent; Zaire with 83.3 percent; Burundi with 81.8 percent; Syria with 81.6 percent; Paraguay with 78.9 percent; Sudan with 75 percent; and Argentina with 71.1 percent. None of these countries boasts the long history of civilian rule that Korea has enjoyed. In its two thousands years of history, Korea was ruled by civilian for all but a few centuries. There is simply no doubt that December's presidential election was a turning point in the 27 years of continuous military rule. For us, military rule began to ebb in December 1987. "Let's leave the evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of military government to history," a retired colonel who is now a political scientist said. "What we must do is determine why Korea experience 27 years of military rule, and we must coolly determine the source of the Army's power. What I mean is that we must understand these things if we're to avoid yet another round of military rule." In 1983 the national budget was 24,089 billion dollars. Of this national defense costs amounted to 7,537 billion dollars, or about 32.8 percent of the total budget. Military expenditures increased by 15.6 percent this year over last, although the budget itself increased by only 8.7 percent. As a percent of GNP, however, the military budget fell from 5.55 percent last year to 5.43 percent in 1983. These facts tell an important story. Although military expenses are increasing in absolute terms, they are decreasing as a proportion of the national economy. The source of the military's strength is physical power, and in a capitalist society physical power is expressed in terms of money. This is the logic of the retired colonel turned political scientist. The military's influence can only decreases as the civilian sector expands, and this is the trend that will ensure civilian rule. The Korean war made military rule possible in the first place, as the Army's manpower and capital exploded far ahead of any other social organization. The military enjoyed a lead quantitatively and qualitatively in the war years and emerged as a hugely powerful organization on the post-war national scene. As economic development built momentum in the 1970s, however, the efficiency of industrial organizations improved dramatically, and they grew until even their size overwhelmed the military. The Army reached the limits of its ability to preside over Korea's government. In the 1988 national budget, educational expenses amount to five billion dollars, or 20.7 percent of the total, second only to national defense expenses at 32.8 percent. The increasing educational budget has helped boost the influence of college students. The two opposing poles of Korean politics, the Army and the students, did not evolve by accident, but the mother's milk of rising budget expenditures nurtured them both. 27. Education Refines the Officers Corps. I'm told that about one-third of all KMA colonels possess masters degrees. And five to seven percent of the graduates of each KMA class have earned doctoral degrees. This means that with the single exception of professors, KMA officers are more highly educated than any other profession. And the Army is very proud of this accomplishment. Professor Yi Tong-hui of Kyonggi Industrial Open College sketched an interesting thesis in his "Korea's Political Development and the Relationship between the Army and the people." He writes, "In the 1950s, at a time when social confusion prevailed in the country and the civilian university system remained undeveloped, the Korea military Academy was already intensively instructing its cadets using American-style methods and inculcating American democratic ideals. Because officers who graduated from the Academy imbibed an education which strongly highlighted professional consciousness, the officer corps as a group may become the future champions of political neutrality for the Army." Professor Yi also asserts that, "We all lost if the relationship between the Army and the people degenerates into question of whether obedience triumphs or defiance triumphs." If we look at the career pattern of a KMA officers, we see that the officer completes a period of educational followed by a military assignment and a promotion, and then the cycle begins anew. A cadet completes four years at KMA and is commissioned a second lieutenant. The new officer then receives four months of basic officer training before serving as a platoon leader. As a captain he completes four months of advanced officer training before serving as a company commander and then is promoted to major. The officer then attends the Army College for one year. After promotion to lieutenant colonel, he serves as a battalion commander and enters the National Defense College for one year before being promoted to colonel. The MND is planning to extend both the Army College and National Defense College courses to two years. Even under the present system, KMA officers undergo about three years of concentrated education after they leave the academy and before they are promoted to colonel. The elite among them also receive training at government expense in universities at home or abroad. This degree of training and education and the military officer's unique sense of responsibility combine to make him a hard-driving achiever even after he retires and enters civilian society. A recent example of this military drive can be seen in the twin engines propelling No Tae-u's presidential campaign in late 1987. The victory was engineered by An Mu-hyok, (KMA Class 14) then National Security Planning Agency director, and Yi Chun-ku, then No Tae-u's campaign director. Those who worked for the two men claim that, "No orthodox politician today, can match either An or Yi in devotion to duty or in the stamina needed to execute that duty." One retired officer saw some troubles, however. He believed that retired Army officers who enter the business world excel as long as they exploit their military spirit to pioneer new areas or solve problems. He regards the retired officer, however, to be unsuitable for day-to-day business management. "These men have been trained to place the highest premium on honor," he says. "When their honor is tarnished by the need to lobby or when they are given responsibility for day-to-day business operations, they provoke internal dissension." 28. A Country in which Coup and Rebellion are Impossible. A high-ranking government official who served under president Chon Tu-hwan at the Blue House made the following comparison. "December's presidential election turned on the question of whether the old generation of opposition politicians were better managers or whether modern military culture was superior. The two Kims publicly promised that only one of them would run for president, but they parted ways when faced with the tantalizing prospect that one of them might actually win the presidency. This must be contrasted with the relationship between Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u. Although tongues wagged everywhere that their relationship would not survive, in fact it endured to the end. Indeed, in spite of differences, they managed to pursue complemental roles to an unprecedented extent. During the campaign, President Chon called in Candidates No and told No that he should not refrain from bluntly attacking Chon if that would help him win votes. Even in the transitional period following the election, President Chon called in his closest aides and told them they must shrug off criticism and work hard to get the new government off to a running start." According to the official, "The chief reason the Army did not intervene in the chaotic situation prevailing in June 1987 was that President Chon stuck to his promise to serve only one term. In any cases, history will look favorably on Chon's contributions. The first objective evaluation of Chon's presidency will come only when history records that during his watch economic stability was established, the South-North balance swung decisively in our favor with the landing of the Olympics, and political power was transferred peacefully for the first time in modern Korean history." In the process of researching this article, I met many retired generals, active duty generals, and military specialists. The one thing they all agreed on was that, "Korea is now a country in which it is impossible for either a coup d'etat or a revolution of the masses to occur." There was an eerie balance to April's general election. Heroes of the dissident camp who ran for the Assembly without benefit of nomination by a major opposition party lost their races, and the DJP's retired military reformist leaders lost their contests to a man--Ho Sam suddenly, Yi Sang-che, Ho Chong-il, Kang Chang-hui, and Kim Chol. Thus, the view that neither a military coup nor a civil rebellion will occur is supported by the symbolism of the family saying that the general election "buried the heroes and the stars in the same grave." At this juncture, an Army move to grab political power would probably fail. Almost everyone agrees that the Army might successfully seize power but could not hope to hold onto it successfully. The Korean society has outgrown the time when the Army could exercise national leadership. The military is now only one of several national power groups. Others are the press, the civil service, college students, the churches, and industrialists. And the relative clout of the military in this lineup sinks lower by the day. Still, we cannot completely rule out another Army intervention. Active duty general officers share this view: "When the ability of the national police to protect society reaches its limits, and pro-communists and leftists violently shake the national flag, then the Army will not be able to sit idly by and observe." It is possible, of course, for the Army to leave the barracks solely to restore stability without staying on to seize political power, but the maturing Korean people and the increasingly sophisticated political parties are unlikely to invite the kind of situation that would test the Army's ultimate intent. The Army did not intervene in June 1987 as it did in May 1980, and the reason it did not was that in 1980 the middle class did not support the students whereas in 1987 they did. To put in another way, the possibility of a military coup d'etat increases as middle-class anxiety increases. Most observers believe, however, that even in the case where the middle class clearly perceives a crisis, a coup would fail unless it enjoyed virtually total national support. A high-ranking government official observed, "If it comes to physical confrontation, no group can vanquish the Army. If democratization is to succeed, we absolutely must not allow the situation to degenerate to physical confrontation." The Los Angeles Times carried an article saying that military support for President No Tae-u would likely weaken because the DJP failed to win a majority of Assembly seats in April's general election. Certainly a degree of tension has gripped the top military leaders as a result of the clout Kim Tae-chung won in the general election, but many expect that the seasoned Kim Tae-chung's turn toward moderation may serve to reduce that tension. A Blue House official looked ahead to the post-Olympic period. He said, "If Mr Kim Tae-chung decides to make a life or death issue out of President No's vote of confidence, politics will heat up and tension will grip the Army as well." 29. Rewards and Sorrows in the Army of a Divided Country. Most active duty officers I talked to agreed with the sentiment expressed by one of their number, who said, "Probably no other group in Korea today suffers less regionalism than the Army." They mean that regionalism is simply not an issue in the Army, where everyone is bound together by a common mission and where all tumble and strain together to train for that mission. But one colonel says that an Army which is supposedly free of regional feelings has lately displayed disturbing signs of bowling to regionalism. "Regionalism in the Army," he said, "has simply reach unacceptable levels." The Korean people's antipathy toward military rule has caused them to forget the admirable qualities of military culture. Until recently, the anti-military atmosphere has been such that people were unable to say that "What's good is good" about the Army, but that is beginning to change. A professor at Seoul National University said, "Frankly, these Army officers are just superior to most of us. Most of them are healthy and honest, have a finely developed sense of Justice, are action oriented, and know how to manage a project, and when you talk to them you find them to be very pleasant people. military society has contributed greatly to the economic development of this nation." Although we have heard it many times, it remains true that the Army's management and planning systems were transplanted into civil government and industry, where they flowered into the efficient management methodologies common today. Some people say that the military is responsible for the explosion of Korean national energy that has now spilled over into the international arena. Korean males have gained experience with society's basic indignities and impediments through their experience in war and their service in the military. We have risen from the very bottom, where one can fall no lower in the process, we have become a uniquely Korean people, filled with bravery and hope. We have released our latent energy, leaping a monstrous leap that has carried us to every country in the world. When confronted by difficulties, Koreans remember the suffering we experienced in the Army, and we regain our bravery: "Hey, just pretend your back in the Army" and try one more time to go over the top. "If you can't do it, keep trying till you can." We owe much of our mental toughness to our military experience, and our mental toughness has served Korea well on its path of progress. In spite of the many problems nagging the Army as an organization, the two or three years we spend in the Army as young men have made the Korean people stronger. We've learned how to leave the loving arms of parents and family, how to overcome loneliness, and how to deal with early reveille, hunger, drubbing, double-time, squat punishment, and even love letters. And Korea's young men share a common military experience that serves as a kind of social bond. If you talk with someone for an hour, you can tell whether he's served in the Army or not. Military culture is ingrained in the character of Korean males. The problem we face is how to return the relationship between the military and the people to the strong state of amity that characterized it before the 1979 Pusan-Masan Demonstrations, so that the Korean people and Korean society can once again enjoy the military culture so much a part of us all. Democratization will never be achieved if we depend on the indulgence and good intentions of military government. We have learned that we can achieve democracy only through confrontation, confrontation between society's power centers as a result of dynamic shifts in the balance of power among these groups. The people's strong demand for power has wrought a miracle, but the price was high. Today, military government has jumped aboard the democratization express ; No Tae-u performed an about face when he should have continued as another military leader; Army officers have gained a healthy respect for public opinion, and may even have awakened to the damage caused by years of military government. The Army's retreat from politics did not occur because the Army yielded its desire to remain in control. It occurred because they had no choice in the matter. The Army held the people to its breast for decades, but now at last the people can again clasp the Army to their breast. The Army is shrunken, innocuous. We have its measure. We respect its role. Kim Hae-ki wrote the lyrics and melody of the "Song of the Old soldier" for one of his retiring sergeants. I've recorded a few lines below. My son, my daughter, don't be sad For you are children of a proud soldier. But you wanted fine clothes, choice food? Don't fret, children of a proud soldier. … What impulse guided my journey through life? The need to show my grandkids North Korea's Diamond Mountains. I awaited that happy day as flowers came and flowers went, But now my youth has fled and left my dreams undone. The rewards and the sorrows of being soldier in the Army of a divided nation--our people know them all too well, but we've had no choice but pretend to forget them. But now is the time to work to recall those dim memories. The process is a rebirth of the people's relationship with their Army.