<영문자료>Korea's Military(4)

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16. Healing the Relationship Between the People and Their Army is the Best Way to Strengthen National Defense. A retired KMA colonel who worked as a senior Blue House staffer in the Fifth Republic said very nearly the same thing: "Academically speaking, an army is conservative and right-wing by definition, but in a developing country the military can be closer to the left or the political spectrum than to the right. Thus, it is wrong to perceive Korea's Army officers to be uniformly conservative. They are certainly conservative when it comes to security matters, but they have very progressive idea when it comes to social and economic issues. The social reforms instituted by the Army's elite after the 16 May 1961 Military Revolution and again in 1980 reflected this liberal inclination." Contrarians quickly point out, however, that the liberalism a number of the ROK Army officer corps lacks either a theoretical or philosophical base and amounts to little more than an ordinary brand of reformism tinged with a heavy dose of romanticism. The danger is, of course, that this brand of reformism can easily evolve into the extreme rightism of national socialism, or it could fade away, a victim of capitalism's insistence on the preeminence of law. Some say that the key Army officers who assumed political power in 1980 advocated the progressive idea of implementing a just society but in the end failed to achieve significant social reform because they lacked a cohesive ideological framework and because they were overwhelmed by the sheer inertia of industry, the civil service, and other capitalistic structures of Korean society. Sin Tae-chin was one of the fast-burners of KMA Class 15. As a cadet, he was selected as KMA 15's "representative knight" (FBIS : hwarang) and was among the first of his class to attain flag rank. But Sin retired last March at the major general rank from the relatively undesirable assignment of deputy commanding general of the First Field Army, while his fast-burner mates from KMA 15 went on to be promoted to lieutenant general. Sin attended middle school in North Kyongsang Province's Andong and graduated from Taejon High School. Many believe that Sin's career skidded into dead-end assignments and early retirement merely because he happened to be former CSA Chong Sung-hwa's brother-in-law. In spite of the wide divergence between Major General Sin's career and the careers of the political soldiers who led the Army during the Fifth Republic, virtually no difference exists between what Sin has to say about the Army's relationship with the Korean people and what the active-duty general officers I talked to said on that subject. "The Army is a fish in a pond called the people," Sin says. "The Army eats and sleeps on morale. If the people censure the Army, morale will suffer, and it will delight in nothing. For some time the Army and the Korean people have seemed to consciously find reasons to loathe each other. But recently the mass media has broken its bonds, and as a result each side will come to understand that their mutual perceptions of reality very very little indeed." Sin went on to explain a theory that the power of the Army is directly related to the degree of popular acceptance and support it enjoys. According to Sin, war fighting capability can be represented by the formula W=ES, where W is the ability to conduct warfare, E is economic capacity, and S is the speed of mobilization. The speed of mobilization, according to Sin, depends on the quality of voluntary cooperation among the government, the military, and the people. if the people do not trust the Army, then mobilization is undermined and national defense itself is threatened. "Thus, nothing we can undertake will strengthen national defense like healing the relationship between the people and their Army." Sin Tae-chin suggested that improving friendly relations among officers and between officers and enlisted men would also strengthen combat power. He said that two other things would contribute to improved combat capability. The first was abolishing private organization within the officers corps, and the second was democratizing Army management by such means as banning the beating of soldiers. "The Army must preserve its organization under any foreseeable circumstance if it is to successfully apply the force required by its basic combat mission," Sin went on. "Organizational cohesion is based on human relationships. When these attenuates, the organization collapses. In the periods of crisis when the Army will be required to use its power, nothing official, no stack of commands, will suffice to hold the Army together. Unit integrity hinges on the quality of human relationships within the unit. Strong armies are built by nurturing unit cohesion, not by punishment and discipline." 17. Military Government Hurt the Soldiers Most. Sin Tae-chin was very pleased with one thing in the Army. "The free and fair Army absentee balloting in April's general election was a victory for the underlying common sense of the military. It was a turning point. The fair voting revealed that the vast majority of the Army wants nothing to do with politics. Having left the service after 33 years, Sin had a lot to say about the sacrifices officers make. "I was so busy being assigned hither and thither across the DMZ that I neglect my children's education. I finally woke up when I realized I wasn't even able to provide them the diversion of piano lessons. I sent my kids to live with a relative in Seoul, and the first time I got down there to visit, my relative's children were happily banging out tunes on the piano. My heart ached when I saw my own kids just standing and staring in envy." "Do you know," Sin said, "during the nine years I wore general's stars, I spent less than nine months living with my family. Obviously I spent most of the time at my unit, but even there my general officer status prevented me from sneaking a little time with friends in a tearoom. I led the life of a Buddhist ascetic fasting in a mountain sanctuary." "Even when friends offered to buy me drinks," Sin added only half in jest, "I couldn't shake my status. I simply couldn't afford the 30,000 Won (41 dollar) tips required in places with hostesses, so I had to stay away from high-class watering holes. And even when I settled for calling my wife to come up and join me for some barbecue (FBIS : pulkoki), I soon discovered the meal cost far less than the tip." Many active duty officers I've met tell me that soldiers are the subject of "disdain" from general society. one retired colonel went further, asserting that society "oppresses" the military. On the other hand, a great many Korean civilians believe the military expects preferential treatment and gets it. Many civilians feel they have themselves been the objects of military oppression. Military officers believe they labor under an oppressive burden of negative public opinion. These contrasting views originate from a mutual misunderstanding which developed during the rule of military government of doubtful legitimacy. As a retired general said, "Those hurt the most by military government were the soldiers." "A few political officers doffed their uniforms and shouldered their way into politics, finance, and the management of government-funded companies", the former general continued, "conveying the false impression that all officers enjoyed such privileges. These men, however, secured their own perquisites by sacrificing the interests of the vast majority of the officers. They banned meetings among alumnae of the various commissioning classes, for example, forcing the retired general officer association known as discriminatory policies toward former senior officers in other ways as well. And they sacrificed the Yushin Recruitment System merely for the sake of votes in the presidential election, even though this program was vital for officers trying to return to civilian society. And above all, a mere handful of political officers caused an Army beloved by the Korean people to become instead the object of the people's loathing." Even after President No Tae-u's Sixth Republic got under way, former generals continued to be appointed as presidents of government-invested firms. The No Administration appointed Kim Tae-kyun, KMA Class 13, retired lieutenant general, to be president of the Korean National Highway Corporation, replacing Chong Tong-ho who left the job to run for the National Assembly on the DJP ticket. A retired lieutenant general and former Army vice chief of staff, Chong is also a graduate of KMA Class 13. The No Administration selected former DSC commander An Pil-chun (KMA 12, retired Army general, and former president of the Youth and Students League) to be president of the Korean National Coal Company. An was also a member of the Hana-hwe. The No Government recently appointed Nam Ung-chong (Interpreter Officer Course Class 6) to be president of the Korean National Broadcast Advertising Corporation. Nam was DSC chief of staff on 12 December 1979. His appointment has sparked criticism even within retired military circles. Many say Nam landed the job because he is a graduate of No Tae-u's alma mater, Kyongpuk High School in Taegu. 18. one-third of Cabinet Ministers are Former Military Officers. In his "The Ideology and Politics of Korean Military and Civil Officials," Professor Kim Kwang-ung of Seoul National University's Graduate School of Administration notes that, "Two characteristics of Korea's leadership elite have remained remarkably constant over the past 20 years. The first is the growing influence of the military elite, and the other is the number of Kyongsang Province figures in positions of authority." The sixth through 12th National Assemblies during the period of military government in Korea. An overall total of 15.8 percent of all the deputies who served in these legislatures were former military officers. Retired officers held 41.8 percent of all Assembly standing committee chairmanships during that time. The more important the legislative position, the greater the chance a former military officer filed the post. For example, 100 percent of the chairman of the National Defense Committees were former officers, as were 75 percent of the Home Affairs Committee chairmen. From 1964 to 1986, 465 individuals served as cabinet ministers. Of these, 155 (33.3 percent) were former military officers. During the same period, 403 persons served as vice ministers of whom 73 (18.1 percent) were retired military officers. During the period, 245 figures served as directors of independent government agencies. Of these, 99 (39 percent) were former military officers. Let's review the place of origin of these ministers, vice-ministers, and independent agency directors. 31.3 percent of ministers, 35.6 percent of vice-ministers, and 39.4 percent of directors hailed from Kyongsang Province, as opposed to only 13.1 percent, 9.2 percent, and 13.3 percent, respectively, from Cholla Province. Compared to the overall population proportions of about 35 percent for Kyongsang Province and 25 percent for Cholla Province, the ratio of high officials hailing from Kyongsang Province is slightly higher than the Kyongsang proportion of the population, but the percent of high officials hailing from Cholla Province is much lower than the Cholla population slice. Former officers overwhelmingly dominate the executive management levels at government-invested firms. In 1987, Professor An Yong-sil of Yonsei University did a study of the backgrounds of 162 executives of quasi-government companies. Former civil service officials predominate among the surveyed group, with 28.1 percent of the total, followed by former professors at 22.2 percent, and retired military officers at 21 percent. However, former officers dominated the three highest positions in the studied companies. Nine of 25 chairmen, 10 of 26 presidents, and 12 of 26 auditors were retired military. One university professor put it succinctly. "Korean society has specialized. It makes as much sense for a former military officer to manage a corporation as it does for a former professor to command a division." 19. About 43 Percent of Field Grade Retirees are Unemployed. The figures in the preceding paragraph make the Army look like a privileged class indeed, but other numbers must be considered as well. According to "A Study of Army Officers' Career Management," a master's thesis done in 1982 at Seoul National University's Graduate School of Administration by present Minister of Defense O Cha-pok, 11 percent of Army officers surveyed about their career attitudes responded that, "There is no chance to succeed." Another 44 percent said, "There is almost no chance to succeed." on the question of career satisfaction, only 33 percent clearly responded that they were "satisfied" with their jobs. O's thesis also reveals unemployment rates for the three field grades (as of 1980). About 35.2 percent of colonel retirees were unemployed; 43.4 percent of retired lieutenant colonels; and 40.4 percent of retired majors, for an overall field grade retiree unemployment rate of 43.4 percent. O also points out that most of those who retire in the field ranks were born in the 40s and early 50s, so when they retire they are at a point in their lies when education expenses for their children are highest. In many cases, therefore, retiring officers experience grave economic difficulties. About 20 percent if KMA Class 15's retired general officers are unemployed, for example, and another 10 percent are working but do not earn enough to escape serious financial difficulty. In his thesis, O lists the occupations of retired general officers as of 1975. Of the 598 total, 8.7 percent worked in politics, 4.2 percent in government; 7.4 percent at government-invested firms, 33.3 percent in civilian industry, four percent in education, seven percent in financial and social organizations, and 8.7 percent in private businesses. Another 1.5 percent lived overseas, 2.3 percent were diplomats, and 22.3 percent were unemployed. For years the government has devoted considerable resources to finding jobs for retired generals or in providing other means for them to support their families, neglecting to provide support for officers who retire at other ranks. Many suggest that this is a major cause of the misimpression among the Korean people that all soldiers receive preferential treatment. Others specifically condemn the Fifth Republic's Soldiers Mutual Aid Society for providing hundreds of thousands of Won monthly in "livelihood support fees" to unemployed retired generals, while all but ignoring retired officers of other ranks. The "contempt" active duty soldiers say they endure springs less from specific ways they are treated than from the "unfortunate impressions" society and the Korean people have about the Army. The press and opposition parties condemn a "few political officers" while seeking to spare the vast majority of military officers and men who seek only to do their jobs, but this effort seems to have had little salutary impact on public perceptions. The chief reason for this is simply that political officers cannot readily be distinguished from dedicated officers. In the case of Pak Hul-to, Army Chief of Staff, for example, the press and opposition parties regard him as a political officers because on 12 December 1979 he commanded the SWC's 1st Brigade, led his unit across the Haengju Bridge into Seoul, and occupied both Army Headquarters and the Minister of Defense, and because he made a negative statement about Kim Tae-chung during the presidential campaign. But many active duty officers consider Pak to be, "The simplest soldier of all. No informed person would take him to be 'political officer,'" not only because of his heroic performance in the Vietnamese war or because he led the team that cut down the offending tree during the Panmunjom axe murder incident in 1976, but also because of his no-nonsense, conventional military personality. Many active duty officers simplistically apply criticism of the few political officers to the Army in general. During December's presidential campaign and again in April's general election campaign, many officers responded with anger to provocative criticism of the Army. One full general attending a private social function heard about an opposition politician who had delivered a campaign speech while holding up a pair of military boots and ridiculing the Army. In the presence of politicians and reporters and without a moment's hesitation., the general said, "If I'd been there with a gun and silencer, I'd have blown the guy away." 20. Active Duty Soldiers Cannot Testify A retired colonel employed as an executive of a quasi-government corporation heard about an opposition Deputy of the 12th Assembly who severely criticized former military officers who work in government-funded firms. The colonel met with the Deputy privately and denounced him in no uncertain terms. "Honorable Mr National Assemblyman. Are you aware of the psychology of us soldiers? If you continue to insult the Army as you have done, then I can conclude only that you must favor inciting social instability. And if martial law results from that social disruption, you, Mr Deputy, will be that first person the Army takes into custody. Do you think the Army's principles are so different? If you keep it up, the opposition will never seat a president in this country." Army officers are reluctant to assume responsibility for the Kwangju Incident; many respond to accusations with a simple question. "What did we do wrong?" Most officers acknowledge the SWC's excessive use of force in containing the situation in Kwangju, but virtually to a man they defend the tactics used. "The Army is different from the police. When the Army is given a crowd-control mission, then the Army must accomplish that mission without excuse. Only the manner in which the mission is to be executed is open to discussion, and that is a secondary issue. As far as the SWC goes, that unit's wartime mission is to infiltrate behind the enemy's lines and conduct violent operations there. The highly specialized SWC trains ceaselessly for this distinctive mission. I believe it was probably a mistake to employ a unit of that type against demonstrating civilians. on the other hand, how can soldiers simply disregard civilians who possess firearms?" Another officer said, "The only possible outcome to constantly surfacing the Kwangju issue will be to trigger a strong negative reaction on the part of the entire officer corps. And that will end up being undesirable for the process of democratization." "If the Assembly should summon active duty officers to testify about military actions during an investigation of the Kwangju Incident," on e high-rank general officer said, "I will not allow them to respond, even if it costs me my job. If we allow soldiers to be summoned, no soldier would ever again follow orders to participate in civil suppression operations." One retired officer said, "The Kwangju Incident remains an unresolved issue because of the naive public information policies of the Fifth Republic. The government should have acknowledged errors, but defended what needed to be defended. They should have apologized about the excessive use of force at the beginning of the incident, and should have convincingly explained that after the city's citizens acquired firearms, the suppressive operations became unavoidable if national integrity was to be preserved." Army Chief of Staff General Pak Hul-to was the commander of a front-line division at the time of the Kwangju Incident. At a social function Pak noted that, "we division commander believed that if the Kwangju Incident spread as far north as Taejon, then Kim Il-song would misjudge and mount an attack on the ROK. The situation was urgent enough that some division commanders believed that we should mount a preemptive attack on north Korea before we found ourselves beset from both the north and south."