<영문자료>Korea's Military(5)

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21. Many Officers Incorrectly Perceive the Kwangju Incident. In meetings with reporters, former Minister of Defense Chong Ho-yong many time expressed frustration about the difficulty of getting his views of the Kwangju Incident published. "Why don't your newspapers publish what I say about the Kwangju? Are you afraid you'll be criticized? Neither former president Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u, nor I myself were in the chain of command responsible for the Kwangju Incident, so why do you keep worrying the issue to death?" Minister Chong said the received many letters from officers who ask him, "Why don't you start defending the military position on Kwangju?" Many people believe that if the opposition parties demand an investigation into the facts of the Kwangju Incident that tension will build within the Army. Opposition parties are not yet calling for punishment of the responsible commander, but the Army already has displayed sensitivity to the possibility that the chain of command might be challenged in some way during as Assembly investigation, by investigating individual commanders, for example. Sources say that the Army took statements from the officers and men directly involved in the Kwangju Incident. According to one high-ranking general officers who had reviewed this material, "When I read those statements, I realized the troops had no other choice." The same general also said that a written statement submitted by retired general Yi Hui-song, Martial Law Commander at the time of the Kwangju Incident, to the National Democracy and Reconciliation Council in early 1988 in which Yi essentially acknowledged that excessive force was used by the military in Kwangju was simply not justifiable. Two of the three SWC brigade commanders involved in the Kwangju Incident have retired: Sin U-sik (KMA 14, retired as a major general) and Choe Ung (KMA 12, retired as a lieutenant general). The third, Choe Se-chang (KMA 13) serves as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest uniformed position in the military establishment. Pak Chun-pyong, who commanded the 20th Division which was sent to Kwangju and participated in the final operation there on 27 May 1980, was appointed recently to be Secretary General of the DJP. Also very recently, So Chun-yol, who was commander of the South Cholla Province Area Martial Law Command during the Kwangju Incident, was made chairman of the Korea Veterans' Association. Many SWC officers have played key roles in the Fifth and Sixth Republics, including Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u, Chong Ho-yong (who was SWC commander at the time of the Kwangju Incident) Choe Se-chang, Pak Hui-do and Chang Ki-o, who served formerly as the Minister of Government Administration. An investigation of the Kwangju Incident will unavoidably joint the SWC, be seen as a symbolic attack on both the Chon and No governments, influence the future direction of Korean politics, and negatively impact the already delicate relationship between the Korean Army and the Korean people. The perceptions of the Kwangju Incident shared with this reporter by many active duty officers often diverge significantly from the faces of the case. Kwangju citizens armed themselves as a means of self protection only after the military had used excessive force against individual demonstrations. Contrary to fact, however, a number of military officers believe that excessive force became unavoidable when citizens armed themselves without provocation. Most officers believe that it was a mistake to use a specialized military unit to suppress civilian demonstrations. Many see the situation from the viewpoint of the SWC's airborne units. These officers point out that SWC units in Kwangju possessed insufficient crowd-control equipment and were confronted with massive numbers of demonstrators. They say that contrary to the common perception, it was the soldiers who were terrified, and who thus resorted to brutal use of power from sheer desperation. 22. The Character of the Army's Top Leaders. Military opinion regarding the 12 December 1979 incident does not seem to be as uniform as it does about the Kwangju Incident. Everyone agrees, officers attempt to rationalize the incident with the logic that, "In the days leading up to 12 December, no less important a military figure than Army Chief of Staff General Chong Sung-hwa was under a cloud of suspicion in regard to the assassination of President Pak Chong-hui. And the problem was simply that Chong failed to choose the manly solution and resign." This logic, of course, speaks volumes about the values of these officers. There seems to be little support in the Army for the concept of military subordination to civilian leadership or for the legal tidiness of constitutional government. As one ranking civilian government official put it, "Even if Chong Sung-hwa were under suspicion in the assassination case, any move to arrest him should have been based on proper legal procedure, including an arrest warrant is signed by the president." The prevailing mind-set, however, seems to have been the one-dimensional, simplistic view that "Will, Chong's a bad man, so we'll be forgiven even if we go too far." As if that were not bad enough, the investigation and trials that followed the 12 December Incident revealed no basis for suspicions that Chong colluded with presidential assassin Kim Chae-kyu. Thus the information on which most officers relied at the time was simply distorted. This suggests that military intelligence can monopolize critical intelligence information and use it to successfully manipulate the unique traits of military organization to mislead the officers corps into erratic behavior, at least for the short term. Thus, Chong Sung-hwa was not subject to the dictates of a sense of justice based on universal values but was instead the victim of parochial values. This was true also for other figures who played feature roles in the incident. For example, Chong Pyong-chu, who commanded the SWC on the night of 12 December 1979, was subjected to various adversities, as were that family members of Chong's secretary of the general staff, who was killed during the incident. Chong was rewarded for following the lawful orders of ROK Army Headquarters that night when his own men shot and wounded him and took him into custody. But the same key players in the incident who treated Chong and others in this unfortunate manner snowered U Kyong-yun with preferential treatment after U was wounded by gunfire while aiding in Chong Sung-hwa's arrest. This disparate treatment lets us gauge the real nature of the "justice" the political officer group publicly espoused. The issue more sensitive to the military than Kwangju and more likely to trigger a military reaction is the demand for an investigation into the corruption of former president Chon Tu-hwan. A key Seoul-are commander told this reporter that he believed this is the one move the Army leadership considers it must block. And the Army no doubt is pressuring President No Tae-U to accept its position on the matter. The lieutenant generals and full generals atop the Army pyramid today are personality closer to Chon Tu-hwan than they are to No Tae-u. Some of them put their lives on the line with Chon on the night of 12 December 1979, some served continuously as Chon's subordinates when he was on active duty, some were members of the Hana-hwe, soma hail from Chon's province, and some fall into two or three of these categories at the same time, making them extremely close to the former president. Moreover these "network" men put more value on personal relationships than on official or private ties. Thus they are adamant that an investigation of Chon Tu-hwan "simply cannot be allowed. It is unacceptable even on humanitarian grounds." Military reaction will be even more acute so long as the Army sees PPD president Kim Tae-chung as leading the demands for investigations into the facts of the Kwangju Incident and corruption by Chon Tu-hwan. Since April's general election, Kim Tae-chung's attitude has seemed more moderate, but the military leadership's view of Kim have not been ameliorated in the slightest by this moderate stance. Given the taut command structure of the military, the attitudes of the top military leadership exert virtually total influence on the attitudes and actions of officers at all levels. only a few dozen lieutenant generals and full generals comprise the top rung of the Army. Let's look at what makes 20 of them tick. only one is an OCS product; all the rest are graduates of KMA. Of the 20, five mobilized troops to support Combined Investigations Headquarters Commander Chon Tu-hwan at the time of the 12 December Incident in 1979. only two of the 20 were not members of the former Hana-hwe. Six graduated either from Kyongpuk High School or Kyongpuk Middle School. No other secondary schools are represented by a more alumnae among these flag officers. Two graduated from Pusan High School, and three from Seoul High School. Ten hail from Kyongsang Province, six from Chungchong Province, three from Seoul, and one from Cholla Province. A colonel serving at Army Headquarters said the following about networks in the Army. "There are three broad categories of networks among Army general officers. The first is based on shared secondary school experience. Virtually all flag officers graduated from only a small number of high schools: Kyongpuk, Pusan, Kyongnam, Taejon, Seoul, Chinju, Kimchun, Masan, Kwangju, Wonju, Kannung, Chunchun, and Songnam. The second network is military school classmates, and the third is comprised of those who have served together in military assignments. Many general officers hail from kyongsang Province, but this is not an example of regional discrimination so much as a reflection of the fact that the Kyongsang area has the largest fraction of the overall population and also because a disproportionate number of Kyongsang cadets applied to enter KMA. The importance of the Hana-hwe netwok is greatly exaggerated." The Army officers corps is composed of men commissioned from KMA, ROTC, the Third Military Academy, and men with baccalaureate degrees. Although ROTC officers predominate numerically, the overwhelming majority of general officers are KMA graduates, and in fact KMA officers lead the Army. The first ROTC graduate ever to command a division was appointed only recently, from ROTC Class 1 which was commissioned the same year as KMA Class 19. Sin Tae-chin believes that a future ROTC Army Chief of Staff must be selected from among officers who are not KMA graduates, as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff has been selected from among men who did not graduate from West Point. According to Sin, "Officers commissioned in different ways follow very different career paths, but those without are to remain in the Army at senior ranks must all attend the Army College as junior field grade officers. It is imperative that the Army College course Act as a leveler to erase disparities caused by divergent commissioning sources, putting Army College graduates on an even competitive footing. 23. The Political Army Will Persist for Another Decade. Because so many of today's top Army leaders were involved in the politicization of the Army, they naturally are sharply opposed to calls for democratization and for ending military government. The likely next Chief of Staff General Yi Chong-ku was a key member of the Hana-hwe. The Chief of Staff after him is likely to be a graduate of KMA Class 16, 17, or 18, and the fast-burners of each of these classes were either Hana-hwe members or played roles in the 12 December Incident which brought the military to political power once again. Thus for at least the next decade the Korean Army will be dominated by this strongly politicized leadership elite. The probability is high that the Army's habit of political intervention will not die suddenly, but will instead trundle slowly down the path to oblivion. Nevertheless, the top Army leadership fully recognizes that, "The time when the Army could control politics is past. The way to restore the Army's honor is for the Army to stay as far as possible from politics." Sources suggest that the Army top brass has told President No that, "The Fifth Republic dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the Army. Please restore that prestige in the Sixth." I heard the following from two unrelated sources at different times and in different places, from a DJP military specialist and a knowledgeable Blue House official. "Had one of the two Kims been elected president in December's presidential election, the president-elect almost surely would not have been inaugurated. In the political whirlpool triggered by such a victory, the Army would not have accepted civilian rule but probably would have chosen to play an independent role of its own once more. "I think that having as president a man like No Tae-u is a former Hana-hwe member and knows the Army well is a very lucky thing for this country. He will help ensure that the Army stays out of politics and will do much to improve the popular perception of the military. In any event, the Sixth Republic can be seen as a transitional government, but with the advantage that President No is fully capable of controlling the military, buying time for the Army gradually t democratize during his tenure. Luckily, man like No Tae-u, Chong Ho-yong, Kim Pok-tong, and O cha-pok who exercise influence on the military share identical views of the role of the Army, and although the future will not be entirely painless, the military will gradually be edged further and further from the political arena." 24. Minister O Cha-pok's Thesis. President Minister of Defense O Cha-pok earned a master's degree in 1982 from Seoul National University's Graduate School of Administration. The title of his thesis is "A Study of Army officers' Career Management." O Cha-pok passed the graduate school entrance examination even though he was burdened by his military duties at the time. The test is so difficult that those who pass the National Civil Service Examination in Administration often fail it. In his thesis, O discusses the "nature of the military when viewed from the vantage point of ethics." First, he says, the military works under a continual awareness of struggle. The Army sees a universe, both natural and acknowledges violence. The military goes beyond the position that man is naturally evil, holding instead that violence is deeply rooted in the nature of man. Thus, the Army is inclined more toward force than toward persuasion. Third, the military holds the group in highest esteem and takes the state as its focal point. Fourth, the military's world view is rooted in realism. The Army bases all its planning and actions on history and experience, making it conservative and realistic. But the military comes up short on flexibility, intuition, and sensitivity. Fifth, the military is future-directed. Officers never forget that life or death turns on victory or defeat in battle, and they cope with this uncertainty by directing their energies toward the future. O Cha-pok points to two peacetime ｅxpression of the military ethic. First, the valor required of soldiers in wartime may express itself in peacetime as an interest in materialistic concerns, like rank and living conditions, and predisposes them to conservatism. Second, the respect afforded the Army in wartime by the civilian community diminishes in peacetime, causing a "drop in Army prestige." O Cha-pok perceives a significant role for the military in various "social undertakings." He sees positive military contributions to society in introducing the nation's young men to citizenship and social relationships, in training a significant segment of the nation's manpower, and in employing men from society's lowest social strata. O notes, however, that due to a rigid dogmatism common to the military mentality, "In underdeveloped countries military contributions to society tend to cause the military to develop a sense of authority vis a vis civilian society which then is expressed in forceful means rather than in cooperation with the civil sector, providing the basis for military control of the civil government." O Cha-pok also pointed out that, "The more democratic the political structure and the more industrialized the country, the more the military lowers its standards, attracting men who fall behind in social competition, thus weakening the Army's ruling class roots." As an example of this tendency, O published materials showing that the high school academic performance of young men applying to KMA was worsening. Majors and lieutenant colonels today were in the top 40, 50, or even 60 percent of their high school graduating classes when they entered KMA in the early 1970s, but prior to 1970 the average KMA applicant was in the top 30 percent of his high school graduating class. O Cha-pok recommended seven measures to boost military professionalism: Increase the value put on military careers by society at large; ensure that only outstanding young men are commissioned; guarantee a fair promotion system; provide for more in-service education and training; provide reasonable compensation; adopt effective means to find civilian employment for officers who fail to be promoted; and accommodate the law of supply and demand in long-range officer personnel planning. In his thesis, O Cha-pok complained education at Army expenses in both civilian and military institutions of higher learning was often provided exclusively to KMA officers. As of 1979, 763 of the 1071 officers awarded such training were KMA graduates. Nothing that officers will always regard promotion as the supreme value and devote a large portion of their energies to achieving it, O then advanced some recommendations for improving the promotion system. According to O's data, 38.8 percent of all Army officers are satisfied with the present promotion system, 18.7 percent are dissatisfied, and 42.5 percent are neutral about it. O Cha-pok specifically recommended that non-KMA officers be considered more promotion-worthy, as should officers in specialist careers, who also suffer from career neglect in other ways. He added that consideration should be given to opening the existing closed promotion board system. "No matter how the face of warfare changes," O asserted, "the essence of military power will continue to be soldiers. In the final analysis, the critical element determining whether an Army wins or loses in battle is that Army's officers and men." O stressed that, "The personnel structure in the Army is completely closed. Unlike the civil service or private industry, therefore, the military cannot bring in top-level administrators from outside when the situation warrants such a solution. Since officers can be promoted only from within the system, the proper nurturing of military personnel assets is an urgent matter."