<영문자료> Korea's Military(1)

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Korea's Military -Wolgan Chosun, 1 June 1988- 1. "What good is an Army if all the people are gone?" Grandma imboon survived, and this is testimony. "The soldier ordered everyone related to a policeman or a soldier to leave the group. About a dozen people rushed away, I guess. When they were gone, the soldiers completely surrounded the rest of us in the ravine. Mr. Mun Pan-tae, who was about 40 at the time, stood beside me, his hands raised high over his head." "'Honorable commander', Mr. Mun shouted.. 'If I am to die, at least allow me to say something first. What good is a country if all the people are gone?' The soldiers fired at Mr. Mun but missed and hit his daughter. She fell right down. She was 15. Then the shots rang out in volleys, like so many firecrackers, and the bullets buzzed among us like bees." In February 1951 during the Korean war, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army slaughtered 719 innocent people in Kyongsang Province's Kochang. Precisely half, 359, were under 14 years of age. Of these, 100 were mere babies, 191 were from three to ten, and 68 were from 11 to 14. The Kochang Slaughter case goes down in history as the supreme tragedy in the relationship between the Korean people and their Army. The Korea Army was conducting operations against communist guerrillas in an area they were known to frequent and took revenge on the innocent residents of the area. The scream that burst from the killing zone three decades ago, "What good is a country if all the people are gone," has now become the plea, "What good is an Army if all the people are gone?" During the 19 April Student Revolution in 1960, however, Army units acting in the capacity of Martial Law troops chose to do nothing but observe as demonstrators opposed to the Syngman Rhee regime proved that they were indeed the "people's army." Then in 1961 in the wake of the 16 May Military Coup D'etat, the Army emerged to take control of civil government. Although the Army was now in a position to directly influence the daily lives of the people, popular anti-military sentiment did not reach worrisome dimensions. In the late 1960s when this reporter wore an enlisted uniform, Seoul bus girls would not accept fares from enlisted men. The girls slyly returned coins given to them by enlisted men because the girls identified with the soldiers. In those years, the army uniform served as a kind of license to behave like a spoiled child in public. Adults closed their eyes when a soldier stole a ride on a train or an inter-city bus without paying the fare. And when you were on leave, sometimes a stranger who didn't even know your name would give you red-carpet treatment just because you were a "suffering soldier." This reporter remembers going on a three-day leave to the East Coast in the company of three barracks buddies, and among us we spent hardly a dime. I think my total travel expenses amounted to less than two dollars because of the lavish treatment we received at the hands of total strangers. An old grandfather who had sent his grandson off to the Army put us up for the night, and a young girl whose older brother was serving in the Army gave us potatoes for dinner. The Korean Army once again appeared on the streets as Martial Law forces when the October Restoration(Yushin) was announced on 17 October 1972, but even then the antagonism of the Korean people was directed not at the Army but at President Pak Chong-hui. Even in the Yushin era the Army managed to preserve an image quite distinct from that of the national Police, who were vilified as the "slaves of dictatorship." 2. The pusan/Masan Incident Changes Good will to Antagonism. The Korean people's positive feelings about the Army began to change into outright antagonism with the Army's involvement in suppressing the demonstrations in Pusan and Masan between 16 and 20 October 1979. President Pak adopted tough crowd-control measures right from the start, sending three brigades of Special Warfare Command (SWC) paratroopers to the scene. The paratroopers struck people mercilessly with rifle butts and riot-control batons, clubbing not only demonstrators but striking innocent passers-by as well. Of those who were injured in Pusan and Masan, some 80 percent of those struck by SWC paratroopers suffered head injuries: brain contusions, concussions, fractured skulls, ruptured occipital bones, facial lacerations, injuries to eyes and noses, and damaged blood vessels in the brain. In the pusan/Masan Incident, the Korean people witnessed the first example of bloodthirsty Army soldiers since the Kochang Massacre of 1951. SWC paratroopers were trained to confront the enemy under the most stringent battlefield conditions. They were unleashed in an urban area among unarmed civilians, triggering a situation in which the national Armed Forces conducted military operations against citizens of the nation. Pusan/Masan foreshadowed the tragedy that was to occur seven months later in Kwangju. On 12 December 1979 a bloody revolt occurred within the Korean Army. The Army Chief of Staff (CSA) was arrested without benefit of warrant and later forced to submit to water torture. A colonel who helped arrest the CSA was shot at the scene and later promoted to major general in spite of the fact that his wound paralyzed him permanently from the waist down, and when he retired he received a golf course as a gift. The 12 December 1979 Putsch planted basic doubts in the minds of the Korean people about who was really in control of the Army. The Kwangju Incident occurred only months later, leaving a deep chasm between the Korean Army and the Korean people. What follows regarding the Kwangju incident are my own views. I am one of only a few Kyongsang Province reporters who have researched the Incident. After full martial law was declared on 17 May 1980, the SWC paratroop units sent to Kwangju used even harsher crowd-control measures than they visited upon the citizens of Pusand and Masan in the October 1979 demonstrations. Kwangju citizens were frightened and ran. When they realized the SWC paratroopers were crueler than they thought humanly possible, the citizens turned boldly on the Army, like a cornered rat turning on a cat. This brute rage acted as a fuse for the explosion that was the Kwangju Incident. The same Army which used force to solve the Kwangju Incident went on to seize control of the government once again. In the eyes of the Korean people the 12 December Putsch and the Kwangju Incident were stages in the same lengthy, military coup d'etat. The previous relationship between the Korean military and the Korean people was so amicable that few such examples exist in world history. But that relationship deteriorated swiftly, leading straight down through an "Army that can fire on its top officer" to an "Army that can user rifles and bayonets against its own people." 3. The Military's New Policy of Openness. June 1985 was a tumultuous time as the National Assembly looked into the Kwangju Incident. This reporter observed an absorbing Incident that summer. An enlisted man was fighting with a young civilian at Seoul's large Chamsil intersection. The young man broke away and ran off a few steps, but couldn't control his anger. Turning back, he threw a rock at the soldier but missed. The soldier charged after the young man, who bolted into the street in front of an oncoming taxi. The driver slammed on his brakes, but the vehicle hit the youth lightly as it came to a stop. The young man was hurt but got up and staggered a few steps before falling flat on his back the scene played out like a video tape in slow motion. Suddenly two men in their forties ran up, grabbed the soldier, and began kicking him violently in the buttocks and punching him in the face. In an another instant a dozen more pedestrians joined the first two, and helped to beat the soldier severely. "I'm just a common soldier," he sobbed. "I didn't do anything wrong." This reporter was able to verify that this "miniature Kwangju Incident" was triggered by the soldier's uniform. A decade earlier, the same uniform caused people to treat soldiers with the kindness they reserved for their own children. Now the uniform had become a symbol that triggered an explosion of popular hate. The 1987 June Incident was a national express of the people's rejection of the military. If the same official terror used in the Pusan/Masan demonstrations and the Kwangju Incident had been employed during the June Incident, even several hundred SWC brigades could not have brought the situation under control. Our Army displayed admirable patience and self completely. Their hands were probably tied by the realization that, "If the Army spills blood again, there will be hell to pay." Whatever the motivation, the Army's self restraint during the June Incident went a long way toward restoring the people's good will toward the military. When labor trouble swept the country in late 1987, the Army stayed in the barracks even when workers with heavy equipment occupied downtown Ulsan and became the city's unchallenged rulers. "They'll come out tomorrow." We said. "They'll come out the next day," we said. But in the end the Army stayed in the barracks, while we conducted a presidential campaign and weathered a crisis over the legitimacy power. The Army has reacted very positively during this period of accelerated change. on 20 April 1988, the commanding general of the Capital Defense Command (CDC) invited reporters covering the Ministry of Defense (MND) to his unit and held and extremely frank discussion with us or for an hour-and-a-half. The general had the ill luck to see himself mentioned in an unfavorable light in numerous foreign press accounts, some of which named him as the leader of the hard-line faction of the Army and as the probable ringleader of a possible coup d'etat. In his discussion with the MND reporters, the general made a simple request: "I would be pleased if you folks would not view the Capital Defense Command as a players in the political game." Later, he joked, "I've been mentioned 86 times in the foreign media. And though I've even been maligned as the guy who would lead a coup d'etat and as the guy who would be president, I seem to persist in doing my job and nothing else. But that seems to worry the press even more. "He also described himself as a believer in "rational justice" and "not a hard-liner too stupid to avoid swimming against the current of historical trends." He stressed that, "Our Army does not want to exercise political influence." The next day, the command general of the Special Warfare Command (SWC) also invited MND reporters to visit his unit, and chatted with us after a counter-terrorism training event held in our honor. The general said, "It aggravates me very much that people think we have horns growing out of our heads." He added that he would, "appreciate it if you reporters could help us get rid of some of this misunderstanding." At another point, the general said, "We have our own story to tell about the Kwangju Incident." Still later he added, "When a political decision is made, the Army is an organization that can kill people." (FBIS : The July Wolgan Chosun says this is wrong, that the general actually said, "When politicians decide to settle problems between nations by means of warfare, then the Army is used for that purpose.") At about the same time, the Defense Security Command (DSC) commander visited the MND press room and talked with reporters there. The lieutenant generals who head the "three commands," the DSC, CDC, and SWC--the three units most crucial to regime security--revealed a positive view of both the press and the Korean people that symbolized the Army's new, open attitudes. 4. A move to Revise the Military Secrets Act. The military's positive attitude toward the press originated last summer when Chong Ho-yong was appointed Minister of Defense. In February 1988, when Chong briefed president-elect No Tae-u on the activities of his ministry, Chong said that the military would adopt a policy of openness. Immediately thereafter in the informal meeting with the MND press corps, reporters asked Chong whether he was also "considering amending the Military Secrets Act." The minister said he was "thinking about that too." This triggered a spate of press reports under headlines like, "Revision of Military Secrets Act under Review." These articles served to help make such a review an accomplished fact. In his first briefing to President No on MND operations, incoming defense minister O Cha-bok told the president that he was pushing revision of the Act. Although the revision movement tries to create the impression that the military will benefit most from any changes in the law, in fact, revision of the Military Secrets Act is absolutely necessary if there is to be any active reporting the military. The people must be told what's really going on in the military if a significant improvement in the relationship between the Army and the people is to occur. If the people are to be informed, the inescapable conclusion is that the stringent limitation imposed by the Military Secrets Act can be relaxed only by amending the Act itself. The "military secrets" the law is designed to protect are defined in such a way as to cover virtually everything related to the military. The MND Press Regulation of 28 January 1984 goes even further than the Act, stipulating that, "Reporters covering the military may not enter MND premises without permission from the Public Affairs Office, and when not accompanied by a representative of that office may enter no MND facility except the press room, the Public Affairs Office itself, and convenient facilities." This regulation has the effect of reducing reporters to the role of newspaper delivery boys. But at Army Headquarters and other major commands, attitudes about amending the Military Secrets Act are extremely negative. one high-ranking general officer at Army Headquarters said, "If we carefully administer the Act, that will do. There is no need to amend it. We don't even know the name of enemy division commanders. How can we unilaterally reveal everything that happens on our side?" The negative attitudes of active-duty general officers toward revising the Military Secrets Act stems quite simply from the fact that the Act has been abused over the years to conceal incidents that occur in Army units and to cover up commander's personal peccadilloes. During the presidential campaign last December, the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) sought to add to list vote total by limiting military sought to abolish the so-called Yushin Recruitment System and to limit the DSC's role in the civilian community. Under provisions of the Yushin Recruitment System, military officers were given preferential, non-competitive appointments to civil service positions up to subsection chief level. In the 11 years from 1977 to 1987, 586 officers left the military and secured such appointments in the executive branch. This number represents fully one-third of all those appointed in that period. But the civilians had to win their positions by passing the exacting Administrative Civil Service Examination. Thus there now exists in the civilian bureaucracy an entrenched, well-defined network of former military officers. Defense Minister Chong Ho-young made the final decision to accept the DJP's proposal to abolish the Yushin Recruitment System, but he did so in the face of bitter military opposition. One DJP official told me, "I'm embarrassed that in all these years the Assembly has established no effective control over military spending, even though we devote fully a third of the national budget to national defense. A glance at the process of deliberating the massive military budget at the Assembly reveals that budgetary documents are provided to Members for only about 30 minutes before they are taken back into possession of the MND. How can a budget of almost seven billion dollars be comprehended in that brief time? The most effective way to control the military is the press. But the DSC mechanism for influencing politics must be eliminated if overall Army involvement in politics is to be rooted out." Officers of Korean Military Academy(KMA) Class 34, now mostly majors, met on the afternoon of 7 May 1988 at the KMA auditorium on the occasion of the 10 year reunion of the class. They invited Chong Sung-hwa to address them. Chong had been KMA Commandant when Class 34 cadets were in their sophomore, junior, and senior years. on 17 May 1988 the Korean Veterans Association invited Chong to attend a briefing for retired general officers about recent development approved a change to the Military Personal Law and had it passed at the Assembly. The changes restored the original military rank of former officers like Chong Sung-hwa and Kim Kye-won, who had been reduced the rank of private in the reserves because of court convictions. Thus, the names of these men were restored to the KVA's membership roster, and they once again qualified for treatment as retired flag officers. Not only was this reversal of formal policy a laudable step in improving the Army's relationship with the civilian world, it also served to defuse significant discord on the issue within the Army itself. Nor is such change limited to government officials and general officers. PPD president Kim Tae-chung acknowledge the fairness of absentee voting within the Armed Forces in April's general election and publicly congratulated the military. RDP president Kim Yong-sam praised the military as "a mature national force." Moreover the military's privileged position of sanctuary ended with the major hold on the Assembly won by opposition parties, aided by the fact that the new Assembly will be empowered to oversee and inspect the executive branch. 5. The Army is Always on the President's Side. At the end of April 1988 this reporter telephoned the office of an Army commander whose unit is located in the Seoul area. The commander's aide answered the phone. The reporter identified himself, and the aid immediately connected the caller to the commander. The reporter conveyed his request, and the general did not hesitate. "Fine. I'll meet you tomorrow." The next afternoon the reporter interviewed the general in his office for two hours. In his early 50s, the commander's frame was every inch that of a general and a perpetual smile played on his lips. But his used of the humble speech forms contrasted sharply with his icy eyes. "I …," he said and then paused for a request for an interview. "A few months ago a number of news articles appeared with my name in them, including quotations from rumors about me current in Japan. The rumors and many other statements in the articles simply were not correct. I sent someone to talk to the reporter. I told him 'You and I are not foreigners, you know. We both live under the skies of Seoul. I'd think at a minimum you'd have come and checked with me before submitting the article.' "The reporter said, 'I didn't try to meet with you because contacting an Army general is all but impossible.' So misinformation was published about me because we're perceived as unapproachable. And then, you called to say you wanted to talk about changes in the military, and I've got things I'd like to say on that. So I agreed to the interview. You were astonished I agreed so readily, right?" The general then candidly proceeded to vent to his personal views, first establishing that he should remain anonymous. He touched on the political neutrality of the Army. ((The General)) "There is way too much misunderstanding about the term political neutrality. The Army's always on the president's side. The constitution makes the president the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. That's difficult term; simply, it means the president is the top commander, a five-star general. The Army must loyal to the president elected by the Korean people, and this is we mean by political neutrality." ((Cho)) The military received high marks for the fairness of its absentee balloting during general election. ((The General)) "In a democratic society it's natural to be loyal to the group to which one belongs. Farmers support candidates who say they'll emphasize agricultural management, and soldiers support candidates who say they'll boost national defense. If the military absentee balloting system was subject to problems in the past, then the problems were caused only by an excess of loyalty. Information aimed at soldiers must be geared to the overall educational level of the Army. If you baldly direct soldiers to vote case, all I did was have my men read a newspaper editor by a professor who discussed the personality of a certain politician."