<영문자료>Korea's Military(2)

게재일   8806 현재위치   2/6 출 전   월조 조 회   1245   Korea's Military(2)

6. Kwangju is History ((Cho)) We turned to remarks made very recently by the commanding generals of the CDC and SWC who invited the MND press corps to visit their units. ((The General)) "President No has repeatedly urged Army commanders to tear down the walls separating us from the press, to open wide the windows of dialogue. The Army maintained contact with the press in the past, but this was pretty much restricted to social occasions involving ranking press figures, like playing golf with the presidents of media companies, chief editors, and leading editorial writers. This wasn't really effective because the Army mistakenly thought that rank is as important in the media world as it is in the Army. We didn't understand the crucial need to communicate with distinguished working reporters who actually pounded beats. "In relations between the press and military and between the people and the military, it is crucial that each side recognizes the other's existence and understand his arguments. Dialogue will never develop if each side measures the other only by his own lights. When I was a captain, a reporter covering the military was rude and offensive to the general I was working for, and when I couldn't take it anymore, I said something. The reporter explained his reasoning to me. He said he adopted exactly the same posture toward the Army chief of staff that he took toward me, a mere captain. He said it was anathema for a reporters to be intimidated or co-opted by the Army hierarchy. It wasn't until he told me those things that I begin to understand the psychology of press people. "At this point, in history, Army officers are different from what they were in earlier days when they avoided conversations with reporters because they felt intellectual out-classed or suffered from feelings of inferiority, or because they wanted to conceal improprieties. President No tells us that there is nothing the military needs to conceal; he urges us to be forthcoming and accommodating with the press." ((Cho)) Kwangju is shaping up to be a serious issue in the upcoming National Assembly session. ((The General)) "It was not just civilians who died at Kwangju. Many soldiers in the crow-control forces died too. Kwangju must be handled with primary emphasis on reconciliation. The press must work to tone down the people's excessive demands. That is necessary for the history of tomorrow. Trying to fix responsibility for Kwangju is like demanding that Gato Kiyomasa(FBIS : phonetic) assume responsibility for Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea in 1592. We must perceive Kwangju as an past history and endeavor to learn its lessons." ((Cho)) Does that mean that if we dig too deeply into the Kwangju Incident that we'll irritate the Army? ((The General)) "Our Army is not so small-minded as to be irritated by that. During April's general election the Army was round vilified, but did anyone respond nervously?" ((Cho)) There is criticism that real power in the Army is wielded by the so-called Hana-hwe network. ((The General)) "The Hana-hwe did exist previously but virtually everything said about it is exaggeration. Some KMA Class 11 cadets born in North Korea formed a private fraternity, and in response cadets hailing from Taegu organized the Hana-hwe. Every Korean organization has its share of private networks. What's important is what that network does." 7. Happy or Sad, its Our Country. ((Cho)) I think the Hana-hwe was responsible for the 12 December Putsch. ((The General)) "As I pledge before God, the Army did not undertake the 12 December Incident for the purpose of assuming political power. The situation developed in a manner that only later swept that Army in that direction. Even this minute I can clearly remember General Chon Tu-hwan persistently rejecting the idea of becoming president. I can bear witness that it was politicians, press people, and religious figures more than soldiers who earnestly begged General Chon Tu-hwan to take over as president." ((Cho)) Is there opposition among Army officers to abolishing the Yushin Recruitment System? ((The General)) "Two years ago, when No Tae-u was DJP Chairman, I recommended to him that we abolish that system. I thought that the number of officers utilizing the system was steadily decreasing; I wanted to shut off what I saw as a brain drain benefiting the civil service to the detriment of the Army; and I wanted to get rid of a system that was heaping scorn on the Army, harming our respectability. The Army is a pyramid. Officers who fail to be promoted as they move up the pyramid leave the Army for civilian society in an endless stream, and society must take room for them. "Right now, however, the Korean people are making it crystal clear that they don't want to cooperate in this process, so we have no choice but address the issue on our own. We are extending age limits on officers in order to slow the flow off officers into the civilian sector. This approach is not without its problems. The Army must constantly turn over if it is to avoid stagnation. Extending age limits raises the average age of Army officers, reducing vigor and slowing promotion cycles. But under existing conditions, we have no choice but accept these negative features. I recall the saying that a patriot 'loves his country whether happy or sad.' The Army is sad right now, but this is the time for us to love our country." ((Cho)) The Army seems to love using the term patriotism more than any other group I can think of. What does patriotism mean? ((The General)) "The term is certainly abstract. To me it means adding something to the national interest." ((Cho)) And how do we define national interest just now? ((The General)) "The expansion of welfare is the national interest." ((Cho)) The usual reason advanced to explain why soldiers must stay out of politics is that military men confuse command and the process of law, remaining inadept at applying the principles of constitutional government. ((The General)) "I was very sad not long ago when I read an article written by a Catholic priest who said general officers treated their subordinates as if they were so many spare parts. We received an outstanding education in democracy at KMA. No other students of our generation were as lucky, and if they happened to be introduced to democratic principles, they were not exposed to them as continuously as were we. No matter what anyone says, former president Chon Tu-hwan will be evaluated as being more democratic leader than was president Pak Chong-hul. "However, it is not authority but charismatic self righteousness that must be swept from the Army. Command can be exercised on the basis of legal authority alone, but leadership must be based on morality and democratic principles. Command is accomplished like a father; leadership like a mother. I wish the Korean people understood that the lower you go in our Army the more democracy you find, a lot more democracy." ((Cho)) Why do you think the Army stayed in its barracks last June? ((The General)) "To be frank, the Army perceived a serious crisis at that time. We saw that the problem would not be solved by the our involvement, and we thought that the situation could be restored through political means. The solution was President No Tae-u's 29 June Statement. Since we have been familiar with President No for many years, we believed he had the right stuff to defuse the crisis. We were able to wait because the situation was under the control of someone we could trust. Had there been someone in that position whom we did not know, things may have gone quite differently." ((Cho)) What do you think about the outcome of April's National Assembly election? ((The General)) "I think it didn't turn out well. But soldiers are trained not to be frustrated even when they plunge into a worst-case situation. We're trained to seek the best solution logic can provide." 8. Investigation of Chon Tu-hwan Bring Catastrophe. ((Cho)) What would you like to say about a desirable relationship between the Army and the people? ((The General)) "If the people continue to hold the Army in contempt as they do now, then government will be impossible. When one is held in contempt, then one reacts. That is a low of nature. The Korean people must understand the Army, and the Army must understand the people. I think we've arrived at the point where Korea must install a cooperative system between the civil service and the military. World history teaches us that national fortunes improve only when this relationship is harmoniously balanced. "Traditionally, Korea put the civil official in charge of the highest levels of national administration. Korea was unable to project its power overseas, stagnating instead within the confines of our small peninsula. The reason for this was that government's primary object was to maintain a system of civil rule. Thus, it is a mistake to regard military government as being completely worthless. Don't you agree that military government can provide an opportunity to establish a balance between the civil and the military? After the 16 May 1961 Coup, Korean began pushing overseas, and we experienced an explosion of national energy. The military mind contributed to those outcomes. "When I visited Europe I noticed that most of the statues honored generals. Soldiers lay great store by honor. I thought at the time that Europe's highly-intelligent civil officials had very successfully satisfied the soldier's need for honor, maintaining military morale at a very high level. Korea's civil officials detest soldiers, hold us in contempt. But they must learn another way." ((Cho)) What does the military think about recent demands for the investigation of former president Chon Tu-hwan or for him to be subject to criminal investigation for Fifth Republic corruption? ((The General)) "President Chon himself speculated that precisely this issue would surface after he left office, but he chose to concentrate on the task of peaceful power transfer. This was a wonderful exhibition of bravery. If the opposition adamantly presses for direct investigation of former president Chon, then that amounts to disregarding the public pledges they made to forego political retribution. Any direct attack on former president Chon must also be an attack on President No Tae-u. If that happens, then history ceases to exist. Have there not already been two presidents who were either assassinated or forced exile? Two is enough. Under no circumstances is it acceptable for former president Chon to be sent overseas. "Were that to happen, the world would mock Korea's level of political development. If we are to allow direct investigation, then would direct investigations find Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam blameless? We must exercise self control at some point on the continuum. The opposition parties, particular, must reign in their attitudes. President No will go directly to the Korean people on this matter, of course. But if the brakes are not applied, the desirable situation we have so laboriously wrought can degenerate to catastrophe." ((Cho)) And what if some kind of terrorism is directed against former president Chon? ((The General)) "Public power is responsible for his protection. And of course, the Army is a component of public power. That kind of incident must be prevented." This general is typical of many military officers. As I was about to leave, he said something I considered fraught with meaning. He said that in the days leading up to the 12 December 1979 Putsch, a group of KMA officers who enjoyed a Confucian relationship of mutual respect with president Pak Chong-hui developed a strong mistrust for Army CSA General Chong Sung-hwa, who was present on the compound where President Pak was assassinated. Chong was regarded with increasing suspicion, the general said, but he refused to resign. Of course, the general pointedly recalled, on 12 December 1979 Chong was arrested and removed from office. I am stricken with the notion that we must pay strong attention to the question of how the unique propensity of the military mind for loyalty to seniors and for maintaining the Confucian relationship of mutual respect will manifest itself in the case of Chon Tu-hwan. 9. Dancing officers On 7 May 1988 this reporter visited an Army Corps Headquarters on the outskirts of Seoul. I was interested to discover the officers' attitudes. The reporter's guide was Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Chang, 43, the Corps Troop Information and Education officer, who had graduated from Hanyang University and been commissioned in 1968 from OCS. Chang was completing 20 years of Army service. He said his family home was a 650-square foot apartment in Seoul's Kaepo-dong (subward) that he leased for about 13 million Won (18,000 dollars) in key money. His wife and two children lived there, while Chang himself lived in a military apartment at Corps Headquarters. Chang drew about 500,000 Won (700 dollars) in monthly salary, of which he used about 150,000 Won (206 dollars) for personal expenses and another 30,000 Won (42 dollars) per month on apartment management fees and utilities. LTC Chang received official leave once a month--three days and two nights--to visit his family in Seoul, and brought them to visit him at his quarters about twice a month. Chang was in his seventh year of living apart from his family. "Lately," he said, "they've done away with orderlies even for full colonels, so the most nettlesome thing for me is having to get up and make breakfast for myself and then having to make dinner at night." In his 20 years as an Army officer, LTC Chang has moved 16 times, and each time his wife has done the packing. The corps Headquarters was as well-manicured as a national park. The Commander, a lieutenant general, received this reporter in his office on the second floor of the command building. The general had a bone-crushing handshake and an imposing physique, but this Seoul native was always smiling and seemed relaxed. During the interview, the general was accompanied by the DSC Unit Commander, a colonel, and by LTC Chang. The general avoided answering political questions, insisting that, "I don't look to the rear; I look only to the front." During the three-hour interview, we spent much of the time discussing the relationship between the Army and the Korean people. The general was inclined neither to adjust his own reasoning nor be persuaded by mine. "The Army today," he said, "is just not yet a 1988 Army." And then he launched into an explanation of a number of ways in which, however, "the Army is democratizing from the inside." As example of the process, he mentioned a ban on striking soldiers, educating enlisted men in self ｅxpression, and educating officers with the idea that leading enlisted men can best be accomplished by treating them as if they were members of one's own family. The general's leadership principles were three, he said. First, blaze the trail and the men will follow. Second, if they should fail to follow, use persuasion. Third, only when persuasion fails should the leader resort to forceful means like issuing orders. The Army uses disciplinary training units in lieu of the beatings and other corporal measures of yesterday. Problem enlisted men are sent to disciplinary training units for one or two days where they are made to do such things as double time in full combat gear. The general emphasized the positive features of military culture. "Civilian society is based on material values, but the Army aims at practical application of the spiritual values of justice and patriotism." The general also mentioned the Army's superior morality. "We must build the Korean people's ethics. I'm very frustrated that Korea is not recognized as having a characteristic national morality such as Japan's sense of loyalty, China's sense of honor, Britain's instinct for fair play, or America's Puritanism." According to the general, the Army is the Korean people's spiritual training center. "If we who now face Dracula," he said, "commit an error of execution, then the Army and the people must sit down and agonize together to find ways to minimize the error." As he stood to close the interview, the general added, "This has been the plea of a front line soldier." 10. Female Officers Conduct Ideological Training. I had lunch with the corps commander and his staff at the officers mess. The officers eat only lunch at the mess, which is operated by monthly fees taken from their pay. Enlisted men have unlimited dining rights, and can eat as much as they want. The Corps publishes the monthly enlisted menu, which contains not only meal listings but calories counts, contract food prices, and even the name of the contractor who supplies the food. According to the menu, the daily individual food allowance costs 1,475 Won(two dollars) for 4,055 calories. The menu is based on rice and three dishes per meal. Each man is given one egg per day and three servings of beef, 12 servings of pork, eight servings of chicken, and 31 portions of seafood each month. As we were dining, a pretty female lieutenant began a 10-minute lecture, going about it as if it were daily occurrence. A graduate of Kangwon University and a Troop Information and Education officer, the lieutenant discussed the problem of pro-communist and leftists in Korean society. "When I was in college," she said, "I thoughtlessly participated in demonstrations." Later on, her voice rose as she said, "A fantasy prevails in Korea that communism as a theory is all right; problems arise only when it comes to putting communism into practice. We must never merely tolerate those enthralled by this fantasy." I was told that the Army started using female Troop Information and Education officers a few years ago, and that officers and men alike enjoy lectures given by these pretty female officers. The Army guarantees that these female officers can remain on active duty even after they marry. When lunch was over, we were walking past the headquarters command building when I noticed dozens of officers dancing outdoors. The dance looked like one a troupe would perform at a tavern, and now Army officers were performing it in broad daylight a mere stone's throw from their headquarters. Are those officers dancing? The general explained, "Military culture gives short shrift to the emotions, so we're encouraging our officers to give their emotions more freedom. We think singing and dancing help in this regard." I stopped by the military apartment located on the corps headquarters compound. The apartments were constructed for company-and filed-grade officers. Each 430-square foot apartment was heated by a coal briquette not be left on the floor but had to be hung on pegs along the inside wall. I visited the apartment of Captain Chong Kwang-chae, 34, a graduate of the Third Military Academy. His wife O Chong-ae, 30, had a youthful face and a very trim figure. They had been married six years and had moved five times. In the two years they had lived in their apartment, they had never visited Seoul, a one hour bus ride away. Of the 300,000 Won (414 dollars) Captain Chong brings home each month, the family 100,000 Won (138 dollars) and puts 50,000 Won (69 dollars) into a mutual aid society. They say they spend 150,000 Won (207 dollars) for living expenses for their two children and themselves. "Seoulites believe Army people live well," LTC Chang volunteered, "but they fail to understand that military apartment are tiny compared to the 1,000 to 1,500 square-foot flats they enjoy. But the reality is as you see it here. Virtually none of the company grade officers and only thirty or forty percent of the field grade officers can afford to buy their own apartments. Chang then produced a chart comparing military and civilian salaries. It looked liked he'd had the chart all ready for me. Military and Civilian Wages(in won)