Threshold States in East Asia/조명진

 

 

Threshold States in East Asia

Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation

 

 

 

Cho Myeong Chin

 

Security Policy Advisor & Defence Industry Analyst

 

 

 

 

2006

 

 

This paper is part of the East Asian security project commissioned by Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).  In the project, I was in charge of two Koreas and partly China. Here shows chapters 1, 2 and 3.  However, it should be noted that this paper does not reflect FOI’s view, but the author’s own.

 

 

Preface

 

1 Republic of Korea (pp.5-17)

1-1 Foreign and Security Policy

1-1-1 Alliance with US

1-1-2 North Korea

1-1-3 Future of US Troop Stationing

1-2 Future Military Capability

1-3 Nuclear option-technical aspects and political perspectives

 

2 North Korea (pp.18-22)

2-1 Security Situation

2-2 Assessing the Military Capability

2-3 Three Real Threats

 

3 China (pp.23-29)

3-1 Proactive Foreign Policy

3-2 Modernisation of PLA

3-2-1 Current Trends of China’s Air Power

3-2-2 Nuclear Forces

3-3 Encircling China

3-4 Challenges to US

 

4 Taiwan

4-1 Defence policy and the China issue

4-5 Nuclear option-technical aspects and political perspectives

 

5 Japan

5-1-1 Alliance with the USA

5-1-2 Relations with China

5-1-4 Future of U.S troop stationing

5-2 Future military capability and the SDF

 

Preface

 

East Asian Security Environment

 

The regional system in Asia today is quite fluid and complex. New features are appearing while old characteristics (i.e. alliances) are being redefined.  As a result of this fluidity, the evolving Asian system is not easily described or defined.[1]

 

The US-led security system remains the predominant regional security architecture across Asia.[2] During the second Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration, the US has sought to strengthen each of these bilateral alliances. Strengthening has involved some redefinition as well.

 

The US alliance with Japan has undergone the greatest redefinition and strengthening, while the alliance with South Korea has seen turbulences and discord, particularly in the policy-making towards North Korea.

 

The U.S. Global Defense Posture Review envisions changes in deployments and command structures that increase joint military interoperability and further facilitate Japan’s involvement in global peacekeeping operations.[3] Japan and Korea have contributed to the “coalition of the willing” by deploying troops to Iraq, 2,000 and 3,400 personnel, respectively.

 

According to the Joint Statement of U.S-Japan Security Consultative Committee of February 19, 2005, Japan has involved collaboration on theater missile defense (TMD), a resolution of the nettlesome Okinawa bases issues and the issuance of a Joint 2+2 Statement on mutual security interests, which outlined twelve common strategic objectives, including a controversial clause identifying Taiwan as a matter of “mutual security concern”.[4]

 

In the meantime, there is growing concern of an inability to meet pressing needs through effective organizations. Asian regionalism faces an impasse centered in Northeast Asia.[5]  As a matter of fact, it has been reflected in the refusal of China’s President Hu Jintao to meet Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi in Busan and Kuala Lumpur, November and December 2005 respectively, and the announcement that Korea’s President Roh Moo Hyun would not meet Koizumi during his presidency.

 

The nature of the security issues exacerbates cultural divisions. Chinese and Koreans see Japan’s realist moves for a greater military role through an historical lens. Of late, increasing numbers of Japanese perceive China’s military rise through the narrow lens of a communist state defiant of universal values.[6]

 

The path to regionalism begins with cooperation in resolving the nuclear crisis over North Korea. This is the first priority because it is the centerpiece in security fears in East Asia. The challenge is to forge a consensus of the five countries facing North Korea.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter one: Republic of Korea

 

1-1 Foreign and Security Policy:

Participatory Government's Policy of Peace and Prosperity

 

Since the 2000 June Summit between two Koreas, a sudden reconciliatory mood in the Korean Peninsula has made the security landscape in the region look quite different from the past. Because of the summit, the image of the North Korean regime as a half-century enemy has unexpectedly changed into a ‘negotiable partner’ and ‘reliable economic collaborator’. The problem lies that such image change has only taken place in the South, whilst the North has stuck to its strategy toward the South.

 

As a follow-on of the former President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy, President Roh Moo Hyun, whose government is named as ‘Participatory Government’, outlined the Policy of Peace and Prosperity in his inaugural address of February 2003. The policy aims to help build peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia on the basis of a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of an inter-Korean economic community.

 

In other words, the Policy of Peace and Prosperity is a comprehensive national development strategy that encompasses issues of reunification, foreign policy and security. In pursuing parallel progress not only in the economic sector but also in the military/security sector, it explores a balanced approach to peace and prosperity.[7]

 

There has been substantive progress in inter-Korean relations following the 2000 June Summit. And the rising interest of neighboring countries on the geo-economic significance of the Korean Peninsula has become a focal point in East Asian security environment.

 

Furthermore, President Roh's pronouncements on a "balancing" role for Korea in Asia respond to such aspirations for a greater Korean role in its region, indeed a role in world affairs.[8] In this context, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is one of the early contributors to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and currently has 3,400 troops in country, making it the third-largest peacekeeper in Iraq. The Korean government has committed $60 million for Iraq's reconstruction and pledged an additional $200 million in assistance through 2007.

 

Nonetheless, there are two major concerns amongst Korean defence planners, who still regard North Korea as a major threat. one is how fast the Korean Armed Forces can change their current status, namely to become fully operational and no longer be kept under the military shadow of the US forces stationed in Korea. It can be suggested that the US reduction in size and commitment on the divided peninsula accelerated the process. The other requires a blueprint and a vision of how to build up a technically advanced self-reliant military capability before and after the reunification.

 

In this respect, President Roh stated that the Republic of Korea should do more for its own defense. As the world's tenth largest economy, Korea is already doing so with the major procurement projects such as the F-15K fighter, T-50 trainer/light combat aircraft, KF-X(next generation indigenous fighter), P3 anti-submarine warfare aircraft, Korean Helicopter Project (KHP), next-generation submarine(SSX), KDX-II/III destroyers. In order for this, the Korean National Assembly has approved a 13 percent increase in its defense spending for the next fiscal year. In fact, the Korean defence budget has steadily been on the rise over the last decade. 

 

1-1-1       Korea’s Alliance with US

In October 1953, the Republic of Korea and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, laying the foundation of the ROK-U.S. alliance. During over 50-year relationship with the United States as both contributor to the Korean economic prosperity and reliable military ally, Korea was able to transform itself from an economic basket case to a global player with the 10th largest economy in the world.

 

By and large, the Korea-U.S. alliance is a success story, for the United States as well as for Korea. Not only has Korea become a major economic and diplomatic partner in East Asia, but from a global strategic perspective, it has played as a formidable force to deter against renewed aggression by communist North Korea and to put into place a peninsular link in the United States' broader containment policy against the Soviet Union. As a result, the alliance has outlived the demise of the Soviet Union and even the end of the Cold War.

 

However, the simplifying logic of the Cold War era has been replaced by new complexities that need to be evaluated with respect to their near and longer term implications for the alliance. In an era where Seoul and Washington are closely coordinating a parallel peace offensive toward Pyongyang, it has become increasingly difficult to vilify North Korea. And needless to say, minus a clear-cut image of North Korea as the "enemy", the security rationale underpinning the alliance is seriously weakened.

 

To this point, one Korean security expert, Lho Kyung Soo questions about what new strategic rationale would justify and underpin the partnership, accepting that the United States and Korea wish to remain alliance partners beyond the time when the North Korea threat is gone or greatly diminished. He claims that the rationale will critically depend on how the respective interests of the United States and Korea either converge or diverge at this juncture against an extremely fluid East Asian strategic backdrop.[9] In other words, there has been a serious shift from a local nature of a military threat (coming from North Korea) to a larger uncertainty associated with extremely fluid East Asian state of affairs. The Korean Defence White Paper summarized this change by stating:

 

The ROK-US alliance should gradually delineate roles for the two parties: ROK will play the leading role in deterring a North Korean attack with the US playing a supporting role, and the United States will play the balancing role in the region.

 

 

Sea Change in the Alliance

Despite the pivotal contributions of the ROK-US alliance and American forces in Korea to the security in the region, the alliance appears to be on the course of collision. The core of bilateral friction lies in perceived trade-off between inter-Korean engagement and the ROK-US alliance in dealing with the North Korean nuclear fiasco.[10] As a matter of fact, this is what North Koreans have wished the ROK-US alliance to be. Since the June Summit of 2000, a crack in the alliance has become greater so that some skeptics in Washington began to view the Roh Government as a mediator between the US and North Korea, and raise a strong voice of pulling out the American troops based in the South. 

 

The result seems that North Korea has succeeded in undercutting the ROK-US ties in the name of inter-Korean cooperation (minjok gongjo) and pointing its finger to the US, as a major obstacle in the process of the reunification. The Nodong Shinmun’s Editorial in 2004 states like this:

 

"The current structure of confrontation on the Korean peninsula is between Korean peoples of North and South and the United States.... We should counter American imperialists' irrational and conspiratorial war maneuver with unified forces of the Korean people."

There is another cause for the growing gap between the ROK and the U.S. American handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-1994, which deliberated on military actions without due consultation with Korea, has renewed anxiety and fear of Seoul's leadership over potential U.S. unilateral military actions.[11] In relation to this, the Korean Defence Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, made it clear, "our position is that we will not allow for pre-emptive US attacks on North Korea without the prior consent of Korea under any circumstance.[12] This warning is easily viewed as an infringement in coordination between the two allies. This underlines long-term concerns for and at the same time strong commitment of the US to its ally, Republic of Korea.

On the other hand, as a result of Future of the Alliance (FOTA)[13] process, the United States set in motion an $11 billion program in force enhancements on the Peninsula and in the region to strengthen the deterrence capability in support of the Republic of Korea.

This must be interpreted as a strong commitment of US as a half-century old ally.

 

Changes in the Air: From Peacetime Control to Wartime Control

At the 37th Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting of 2005, Korea and the U.S. have agreed to "appropriately accelerate" discussion on the return of wartime perational control, which currently rests with the U.S. It was one of 13 points agreed at the 37th annual bilateral Security Consultative Meeting headed by Defense Minister Yoon Kwang Ung and his U.S. counterpart Donald Rumsfeld.[14] In fact, Korea assumed control of its military during peacetime in 1994, but wartime control has remained in U.S. hands since the Korean War.

 

It is evident that with regard to ‘the redemption of Korea's Operational Control Authority’, there is reservation among the US defence planners. They are reluctant to allow the ROK Army generals to take operational control during a conflict with North Korea, since they believe that the ROK generals are not trained or have the wartime experience to properly implement the combined theatre operations with the US military.

 

In the meantime, the Korean government plans to take over the wartime operational control by 2014, even though the US has not mentioned about the detailed timetable yet.

Because of this difference, the issue could be a source of disagreement between the two parties. 

 

Strategic Flexibility

Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in their first regular strategic consultation on 19 January 2006, agreed that American troops stationed in Korea should be a force of "strategic flexibility," allowing them to be swiftly transferred from the peninsula to regions of conflict or to provide support for other needs.[15] However, the Korean government emphasized that a flexible approach will be adopted on a case-by-case basis without causing a major transformation of the alliance's defence.

 

Since discussions began on the new U.S. policy in 2003, the Korean government has been reluctant to permit U.S. troops based in Korea such flexible movement out of concern that it could drag Korea into overseas conflicts like a war between China and Taiwan.

 

In 2004, the United States pulled out 3,600 soldiers attached to the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division from Korea and sent them to Iraq. However, after serving in Iraq, the brigade of U.S. troops will not return to Korea.

 

On strategic flexibility, the joint statement reflects both the needs of the United States and the concerns of Korea:

 

"The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and respects the necessity for the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in the ROK," the statement read. "In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people."

 

 

1-1-2North Korea

Since the technical war situation on the Peninsula has lasted longer than a half century, a question can be raised to what degree the prolonged stalemate on the Peninsula has affected and continue to affect the resolve of the ROK Armed Forces to fight North Korean forces in the long run. Together with numerous cases of ROK privileged-class’ exempting their sons from the military duty as well as the reconciliatory mood, it does not look easy for the Korean government to encourage its people to fight against the North Koreans with a suddenly-changed relative or same folk image.

 

Probability of War

Several factors might hinder the likelihood of war in the Korean peninsula. The nuclear option aside, the struggling communist state's economic problems have limited arms modernization, lowered military readiness and made it more difficult for North Korea to use a military option to reunite the Korean Peninsula by force.

 

Moreover, the political environment in East Asia is strategically different in 2004 from it used to be during the Korean War 1950-1953, when China and Soviet Union supported the North as communist allies. In a future war, there would not be such cases.

 

Some experts assert that ROK Army cannot win a war with North Korea without the US involvement, since The ROK military does not have the capability to conduct critical war time missions such as precision bombing over North Korea's rear areas or collecting usable signal intelligence. That is why the intelligence sharing mechanism is regarded as a key area in the ROK-US alliance. Technical intelligence is of particular importance because of the opacity of the Kim Jung Il regime. 

The U.S. Army’s daily reconnaissance flights[16] would provide the first clues, if the North Korean military were to go on the offensive. This lack of capabilities, even if the ROK military were to win a war, would make any war longer and more devastating than it needed to be. It is also possible that the war could turn into protracted low-intensity conflict. Presumably, that is exactly what the North Korean government and military are betting on.

 

On the other hand, North Korea has got an option of nuclear weapons, which is allegedly conditioned by the perceived threat by US. Although North Korea accepts that nuclear weapons are meant solely as weapons of deterrence, it does not have no-first use policy. Thus, it may well initiate the use of WMD in a serious armed conflict with Korea and US. The conditions whereby North Korea may consider the first use of WMD, especially nuclear weapons include:

 

l      Geography: facing the conquest of its major territory, particularly the capital city Pyongyang

l      Military: facing the destruction of the whole command system

l      Political: facing the regime’s collapse through subversion

l      Strategic: facing a pre-emptive US strike against strategic targets[17]

 

These thresholds do not appear low, given a series of negative developments in the Korean peninsula, including the naval clashes and test firing of North Korean various missile systems.

 

Operation Plan OPLAN 5026

OPLAN 5026[18] is a war plan intended to invade North Korea to demolish its armed forces, capture the capital at Pyongyang, and destroy the North Korean regime. The US capability is key to an operation plan by Washington, code-named OPLAN 5026, which specifies such an air strike on North Korea in the event of a war.[19]

 

The US planes like US F-15Es, B-1Bs, B-52Hs and F-117s in the region are capable of delivering about 750 precision guided munitions, specifically the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, on 612-756 aim points in North Korea. The inclusion of US war planes in South Korea and missiles being launched by cruisers, destroyers and submarines will enable the US forces to strike 800-944 aim points. The targets include weapons of mass destruction facilities, surface-to-air missile batteries, air defence radars and command and control locations.

 

 

ROK's Airpower vs North Korean Airpower

It is evident that the airpower of ROK-US Combined Armed Forces[20] is far superior to that of North Korea. The comparison between North and South indicates that the South possesses more modern military hardware and well-trained pilots, whilst the North keeps numerical edge over its counterpart.[21] This comparison does not necessarily demonstrate which Air Force can operate more effectively in the event of military conflict.

 

Whilst the North Koreans clearly has the operational capability of carrying out a war independently, the South lacks such an asset. The Korean Air Force, that began its history as a unit of the United States' Air Force during the Korean War, is still dependent upon the US. This is also a legacy of the ROK-US combined military doctrine.

 

Under this setting, the operational scope of the Korean Air Force has been limited due to its reliance upon the US airpower, particularly in the area of intelligence gathering by intelligence satellites and U2s. The KAF operates two types of intelligence aircraft based on Hawker 800XPs- the four signit aircraft, called Paekdu, and four synthetic aperture radar-equipped versions, called Kumgang. The Korean and U.S intelligence operations come together in the Combined Intelligence Operations Center, which is fed, in part by the Korean Combat Operations Intelligence Center.

 

Due to the financial constraints, the North Koreans has not been able to revamp its air force. Nonetheless, it has shown keen interest in importing MiG-29, MiG-31 and Su-25. The North Koreans have put their effort in assembling the combat aircraft instead of purchasing the hardware on-the-shelf. However, the tactical usefulness of those fighter aircraft is mainly dependent upon how the North Korean Air Force can utilise advanced air-to-air missiles such as Russian AA-11 Archer and AA-12 Adder and how many they possess.[22]

 

1-1-3 Future of US Troop Stationing

In June 2004, during joint military discussions, the Pentagon proposed to withdraw 12, 500 of the 37,000 US service personnel posted in Korea. Amongst the forces withdrawn is one of the two 3600 person strong US Army brigades stationed in Korea. They are part of the US 2nd Infantry Division, which has three brigades. one brigade of the division has its garrison location in the US (though that brigade is currently deployed in Iraq), the other two brigades being stationed in Moonsan.

 

Although some see this redeployment as part of disappearing tripwire concept[23], others view it as a way of the Pentagon’s disciplinary measure to the Korean government. It is speculated that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is punishing Korea for the growing anti-Americanism of its public and the alleged left-leaning ways of the current Roh government. Most experts do not agree on this view. However, it is possible that Rumsfeld finds the U.S.-Korean alliance difficult to manage.[24] Michael O’Hanlon, who believes the trip wire is still sound, argues that North Korea would have to know that any attack on the ROK would surely result in a full-scale American reinforcement and combined offensive with the ROK to overthrow its government.[25]

 

In the meantime, the US tries to ensure that it keeps the current level of US air power in Korea. US officials have emphasized that whilst they propose to withdraw ground combat forces, they continue to contribute to Korean defence using air and naval forces. The US air power is seen as crucial to halting any North Korean advance, because without US air support, the Korean military still feels vulnerable to the possible asymmetrical offenses from the North.

 

Concerning the sea change in the alliance, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless says that the ability of both forces to increase their capabilities and transform their force structure in a complimentary way allows us to have a net gain in our deterrent capability as we reorganize ourselves and reorient ourselves on the peninsula."[26]

 

1-2 Future Military Capability

 

Korea Air Force

The number of KAF strength would remain unchanged at 65,000, while the army would be most heavily affected by the Defence Reform[27] presented by the Ministry of National Defence in September 2005.   

 

The inventory of the KAF will be reinforced with 40 F-15Ks from 2005 to 2008, together with 170 F-16Ks. In addition, 94 T/A-50s, as light-combat aircraft, will be delivered to the KAF. These three types of aircraft will play a role as main combat aircraft of the KAF for the next three decades.[28] Boeing has promised to assist Korea to develop KFX until 2015, as part of its offset deal of selling the F-15K package.[29]

Korean Navy 

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) currently operates a submarine flotilla of nine diesel-electric Chang Bogo-class (Type 209/1200) vessels based at Chinhae. Four Type 214 hybrid diesel-electric/fuel cell AIP vessels are in the process of being build at Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyards under cooperation with Germany's Howaldtdwerke Deutsche Werft (HDW).

North Korean submarines are posing a significant threat to the ROK's sea lines of communication and frequently intruding into its territorial waters. The Navy has procured 26 Romeo-class submarines and 35 Shark-class submarines. ROKN submarines can be expected to play a vital role in sea denial to hostile forces and anti-submarine warfare.  In addition to the naval aspect of the existing tension on the Korean Peninsula, there are unresolved territorial disputes between Korea and Japan over Tok-do. Japan operates 16 submarines (2,500 ton-3600 ton) at the moment, and 70 per cent of its operation takes place in East Sea (Sea of Japan).[30]

There have been reports that some Korean officials have expressed their intention of developing a nuclear-propelled vessel. The first of its class would be deployed starting in 2012 and would be armed with indigenously developed land-attack cruise-missiles.[31] The claim concerning the propulsion system was later denied by government officials, while acknowledging that a 3,500-ton diesel submarine was indeed being planned.[32] Above all, this development would represent not only a qualitative increase in ROKN's capabilities, but would also hint at a changing interpretation of the strategic environment. By 2020, Korean navy is expected to operate 18 to 20 submarines.

 

1-3 Nuclear Option-technical aspects and political perspectives

 

Korea's experiments to extract plutonium in 1982 and to enrich uranium in 2000 do not indicate a present and dedicated effort to develop nuclear weapons. However, the experiments could have broad implications given Korea's past nuclear weapons development program and the ongoing efforts to thwart North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

 

Korea has an extensive nuclear energy infrastructure, and Korean officials have long expressed an interest in establishing an independent fuel cycle capability. Korean officials have claimed these experiments were the result of "scientific curiosity" or part of plans to localize the production of nuclear fuel.[33]

 

On August 17, 2004, Korea's Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Korea had conducted experiments to enrich uranium. The report was part of Korea's commitments under the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), which had become effective when ratified by the Korean National Assembly on February 19, 2004.[34] The official position is that "it was a one-time experiment conducted without government authorization and it was geared toward the country's nuclear energy program". Ironically, "without the authorization or knowledge of the government" was also an explanation offered by Pakistan in explaining the rogue activities of Dr A Q Khan (who sold nuclear technology to other states), in the realm of global nuclear proliferation. Korea also stated that it enriched only a tiny amount of uranium.[35]

 

Many South Koreans resent that Japan has been permitted to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel. Koreans believe this is a double standard and that Japan's militaristic past should bring restrictions upon Tokyo instead of Seoul.

 

There are several legal and political constraints preventing Seoul and Tokyo from going nuclear--but no real technical obstacles. Korea could probably live with a limited and ambiguous North Korean nuclear capability, but no South Korean president could resist the nuclear option if Seoul believes Tokyo is moving forward with its own nuclear weapons program to match Pyongyang's.

 

As long as the United States' commitment to Korea's security remains firm, there is no chance that Seoul would seriously consider the option of acquiring nuclear weapons. At the same time, Washington must also make sure that Japan should not develop its own nuclear weapons. If that were to happen, the US government would have a tough time persuading Korea not to go for its own nuclear weapons.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chapter Two: North Korea

 

2-1 Security Situation

Since the end of the Korean War, the military tension between the North and the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-US) alliance has been there all the time. This is obviously because of the offensive posture of the North Korean armed forces. Until 1980s, North Korean threats used to be confined to a possible large-scale invasion into the South, or low-intensity guerilla warfare against the South Korea armed forces and the United States Forces Korea (USFK).

 

However, the picture has suddenly altered, in the early 1990s, when it was revealed that the North Korea was able to develop nuclear weapons, together with long-range missiles. This sort of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat is directed not only towards the South, but also the neighbouring countries in the region, even part of the US mainland. In 1994, there was an imminent military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, because the North was developing nuclear bombs.

 

At the same time, from early 1990s onwards, there has been radical changes in the North Korean armed forces, which had prepared itself for conventional warfare against ROK-US combined forces. The changes means modernization of weapon systems as well as structural and strategic changes. More specifically, the North focuses on strategic change rather than structural one.[36]

 

North Korea’s unpredictablity and incredibility have proved to be true, even after the historic June Summit of 2000 between the two leaders of Korea, Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung. one of them is the naval incident on 29 June 2002, and the other is the disclosure of the fact that North Korea has done clandestine development of nuclear weapon programme.[37]

 

Ever since announcing the termination of the freeze on its nuclear program on December 12, 2002, North Korea has resorted to such brinkmanship tactics as announcing the withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003. At the same time, North Korea has also been focusing on negotiations with the United States, demanding a non-aggression pact as a means to ensure regime survival.[38] In the meantime, as far as the Six-Party Talks continues, the degree of North Korean dependence upon China is becoming greater.[39]

 

Beginning in March 2003, with regards to the US military operations in Iraq, North Korea has issued orders for increased combat readiness and has conducted air raid drills. It has also continued to voice strong criticism against US military operations as well as ROK's dispatch of troops to the region.[40]

 

Some of the noteworthy military actions taken by North Korea with the intent to create tension include the intrusion of the Yeonpyeong Island airspace by a North Korean MIG-19 fighter aircraft on February 20, 2003, the test-launch of a ground-to-ship guided missile off the East Sea Coast on February 24, 2003, and the threatening interceptive maneuvers on a US RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft by MIG-23/29 fighter aircraft over the East Sea on March 2, 2003.[41]

 

2-2 Assessing the Military Capability

According to Korean 2003 Defence White Paper, the North Korean military threat states like this:

 

North Korea's armed forces are comprised of more than 1,170,000 soldiers

(1,000,000 Army, 60,000 Navy, 110,000 Air Force) in active duty, with more

than 7,480,000 in the reserve forces constituting the Reserved Military Training

Units (RMTU), Worker/Peasant Red Guards and the Red Youth Guards. More

than 70% of the ground forces are stationed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan

line, which enables North Korea to launch a surprise attack and invade the

South without additional deployment of its units.

 

The White Paper tends to regard numerical advantage of the North Korean Armed forces as the most important factor in assessing the military capability. Moreover, the assessment overlooks the fact that 70 percent of forward deployment does not necessarily mean offensive posture, since it can be seen as a defensive consideration from an operational point of view. Furthermore, it does not mention that 80 percent of ROK forces is forward-deployed between DMZ and Seoul. The forward deployment is indeed for defensive purpose.

 

Furthermore, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) of Korea still claims like this:

 

North Korea;s four mechanized and two artillery divisions consists of 3800 tanks (T-55, T-62, T-72, light tanks), 2300 armored personnel carriers, and 14,000 field artillery. The units are geared for mechanized warfare of blitzkrieg.

 

However, the truth is that North Korea is not capable of waging mechanized warfare, relying on tanks and armoured vehicles any more. Nonetheless, the North Korean Armed Forces have concentrated three areas as its core military capability.

 

 

2-3 Three Real Threats

 

1. WMD

Short and medium range Scud and No-Dong missiles are posed as real threat to ROK/US forces, since they have maximum range of between 270km and 1,300km. The numbers of Pyongyang's ballistic missile inventory are about 700, including more than 500 SCUD missiles "of various types. North Korea continues to produce and deploy medium-range No Dong missiles capable of striking United States bases in Japan. The 2,000 km range Daepodong-1 was test-fired in August 1998 and the Daepodong-2 with a range of 6,000 km is currently under development.

 

With regard to nuclear weapons, North Korea is believed to possess at least three or four atomic bombs. It is likely that North Korea might use them, when they see no chance of winning a war over the ROK/US forces, or Kim Jong Il see no way out in his regime’s survival.[42]

 

In terms of biological weapons, North Korea is believed to possess 13 types of bacteria including anthrax, small pox and cholera. As regards to chemical weapons, North Korea has produced over ten kinds of lethal chemicals that include nerve, blister, and blood agents. Some 2,500 to 5,000 tons of these chemical agents are estimated to be stored in six separate facilities.[43]

 

2. Special Operations Forces (SOF)

Pyongyang has built a large and well-maintained special operations force designed to deliver troops via aircraft and submarines covertly into the South to create a second front. The North Korean forces could be clandestinely inserted and use shoulder-launched, heat-seeking missiles to destroy fighters on take-off. Their main mission is to destroy and disrupt the rear front. Because of the SOF’s incredibly high survivability, ROK-US forces are expected to encounter a very difficult force.[44]

 

It is unlikely that the initial attack can achieve the first objective: to penetrate the defence line of the South, without successful operations of SOF in the rear front. The North Koreans have excavated more than 20 tunnels, although ROK has discovered only four. Since these tunnels have been dug beneath the major corridors of access to South Korea's front line, they were dug for the purpose of a surprise attack.

 

Among these highly trained soldiers, possibly 18,000 are capable of infiltration by sea and air simultaneously, probably operating in tandem with other military operations. At a time, when Pyongyang warns that it would carry out a pre-emptive strike against US, a special attention is needed, because the KPN‘s sniper brigades can use three or four cargo ships adapted to accommodate midget submarine in order to reach the US bases such as Okinawa, Guam or Garcia, and even the US soil like Los Angeles and San Francisco. once they landed successfully, the impact of the operations would no doubt bring devastating results, depending upon the SOF’s weapons and equipment. It is also noteworthy that the number of SOFs has recently increased from 90,000 to 104, 000.

 

3. Long-Range Field Artillery

The KPA has set its military procurement priority in acquiring specific weapons systems like 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which are located at hardened sites near the Demilitarized Zone. North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of Seoul, and the total rate of fire of these artillery pieces would be between 2,000 and 4,000 rounds per minute.

 

The DPRK's two hundred 240 mm MRLs fire either 12 or 22 rounds, providing a maximum single salvo of no more than 4,400 rounds. The maximum ranges of 170 mm gun and 240 mm MRL is 54 km and 60 km, which any place in Seoul is within target range. This is a scary threat to the South. Because of some poor precision features of 240 mm MRL, it is regarded as more frightening weapons.[45]

 

Concluding Remark

North Korea is continuing to intensify self-indoctrination under the Military First Policy slogan and is sustaining a vast military apparatus. Also, the further emphasis on WMD development, Special Operation Forces, and Long-range artillery all point to a new nature of North Korea's military threat.

 

In consideration of current depot system and support capacity, North Korea’s all-out war capability and full-scale invasion, becomes implausible, However, it should be noted that the degree of the three real threats (SOFs, WMD and long-range artillery) is obviously expected to increase, as long as the Kim Jong Il Regime can afford to provide fund and finance for those lethal elements.

 

 

Chapter Three: China

 

3-1 Proactive Foreign Policy

The efforts and progress of China in reaching out to its neighbors has been truly impressive, with the notable exception of Japan and Taiwan.[46] China’s proactive engagement of its periphery is of major importance in defining the emerging regional order. Overcoming its earlier hesitancy to engage in regional multilateral forums, China has taken an active role in many. one of the examples is that Beijing has worked hard to address and alleviate one of the region’s most contentious issue: the North Korean nuclear crisis.

 

Beijing’s diplomacy has been remarkably adept, earning praise around the region. As a result, most nations in the region, with the exception of Japan and Taiwan, see China as a good neighbor, constructive partner and non-threatening regional power. Even former adversaries such as Vietnam, India, Indonesia, South Korea and Russia, now enjoy steadily improving relations with Beijing.[47]

 

Under these circumstances, all regional states would be put in the awkward position of having to choose sides, in case Beijing and Washington confront militarily.

 

 

3-2 Modernization of PLA

One of the most remarkable features of People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s modernization is being proceeded, thanks to the surplus yielded by a pseudo-market economy under an undemocratic ‘one party system’. In other words, the Chinese political system does not allow creative economic activities as in other market economies. Instead, it supports monopolistic state-enterprises that play a crucial role in becoming a mighty military machine.[48] Also, China’s military modernization is viewed warily by Washington, while the U.S. security partnerships and military buildup in the Pacific are of concern to Beijing.[49]

 

It is evident that China’s first potential adversary is Taiwan. The US would be supposed to get engaged in military confrontation, if China attempts to use military force against Taiwan. Since 2002, China is striving to develop new capabilities that would allow it to prevail in a war across the Taiwan Strait, while deterring the US from intervening. China has deployed some 750 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. Deployment of these systems is increasing at a rate of about 100 missiles per year. Newer versions of these missiles feature improved range and accuracy.[50]  It is just part of a $65bn defence budget[51] that could increase three- or four-fold by 2020. Cruise missiles are a cheaper, more survivable alternative to developing a modern bomber. 

 

In 1999, Pentagon analysts dismissed the idea that China would be capable of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan any time soon, because it had few modern troop-transport ships. According to Pentagon projections, PLA now will have that capability[52] within one year, by modernizing its Type 63 APC and Type 63A light amphibious tank. The upgraded vehicles can be deployed by landing craft further off-shore and in rougher seas than the original vehicles.

 

Although the principal focus of China’s military modernization in the near term appears to be preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, some of China’s military planners are surveying the strategic landscape beyond Taiwan. Some Chinese military analysts have expressed the view that control of Taiwan would enable the PLA Navy to move its maritime defensive perimeter further seaward and improve Beijing’s ability to influence regional sea lines of communication.

 

Conversely, some of these analysts believe, the political status quo with Taiwan constrains China’s ability to project power. General Wen Zongren, Political Commissar of the elite PLA Academy of Military Science, stated in a recent interview that resolving the Taiwan issue is of “far reaching significance to breaking international forces’ blockade against China’s maritime security. . . . only when we break this blockade shall we be able to talk about China’s rise. . . . [T]o rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development.”[53]

 

 

3-2-1 Current Trends of China’s Air Power

For the first time, the 2004 Chinese Defence White Paper emphasized the shift from territorial air defence towards a focus on both offensive and defensive operations. Finally, with its Su-30MKKs, J-10s, FC-1s and possible upgraded J-11s, the PLAAF will acquire a significant multi-role capacity. With its fleet of sophisticated multi-role combat aircraft, the PLAAF will place more emphasis on deep interdiction missions, long-range ground attack and anti-ship roles. The signposts mentioned above give clear evidence of changes in strategy: becoming more offensive and no longer defensive.[54]

 

The planned acquisition of air-refuelling tanker aircraft such as the IL-78 and airborne early-warning and control (AEW & C) aircraft, providing what are referred to in the West as ‘force multipliers’, the planned development of more capable long-range attack and bomber types (potentially to be procured from Russia), the search for strategic air-lifters (such as IL-76s and/or locally built transport aircraft) to give a real ‘muscle’ to the PLAAF’s potential for airborne assaults with its large special forces, the programmes for new training aircraft, which are essential to improve the skill level of the crews in line with the more complex roles that they are now called to perform, and the interest in new assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are all powerful pointers at the development trends for China’s air power.

 

By 2021, the PLAAF is expected to possess about 3,000 new combat aircraft, while about 30 per cent is going to constitute fourth-generation fighters. PLAAF plans to increase substantially its strategic-lift capabilities. It would require at least up to seventy IL-76s to transport a single airborne division.

 

The future of PLA is being designed to project Chinese power across the Asia-Pacific Indian region and not to dwell on the regional issue of Taiwan alone. The future PLA’s strength will be centered in cruise missile armed long-range strategic bombers and submarines, long-range fighters supported by air-refueling aircraft, airborne early-warning and control aircraft[55], and modern surface warships, rather than the large land forces of previous decades. As a result, the PLAAF position has strengthened within the Armed Forces.[56]

 

It is noteworthy that China has a procurement plan of acquiring 300 J-10s and 250 J-11s. It is expected that J-10 (indigenous version) and J-11 (joint-venture with Russia) will be in operation by 2015 and 2017 respectively.[57]

 

3-2-2 Nuclear Forces

 

Having tested its first nuclear weapon in October 1964, China is an acknowledged nuclear power under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China has never accepted the competitive nuclear logic of the Cold War superpowers. Therefore, over the last three decades, China’s arsenal has remained modest, although it maintains a reasonably assured minimum second strike capability against targets of value to the US.[58]

 

China detonated its first nuclear bomb with the aim of deterring the US and countering possible nuclear threats perceived at the time. Its missiles were planed and developed to be able to hit US strategic targets in phases, first in Asia, and then in the continental US.

Simultaneously, China announced a policy of “no first use” and “non-use against a non-nuclear weapon power”, and has held to these principles until today. A case can also be made, however, that China has moved steadily to a position of what it calls “limited deterrence” (a term used in justifying military actions against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979). In nuclear terms, limited deterrence might mean adopting what it calls “self-defence counter-attacks”.[59]

 

Most studies concede that China’s defence expenditure in comparison to its economy and the size of its armed forces is modest. In the other hand, not so modest is China’s expenditure on its strategic forces. The Second Artillery has consistently enjoyed a higher allocation and priority in defence planning and expenditure. Though its nuclear arsenal is comparatively small, it encompasses a comprehensive range of weapons and their delivery systems.

 

If the US persists with operationalizing a nuclear missile defence system, China might find its strategic deterrent ineffective, and attempt to create a much stronger missile and nuclear weapons capability that can overwhelm US defences.[60]

 

There are possible scenarios of a somewhat lower probability that may lead to a nuclear and/or conventional arms race between China and India. These include the incursion of Chinese naval assets into the Indian Ocean, and the enhancement of China’s troop presence and war-fighting infrastructure in Tibet. Both cases might provoke an Indian build-up of nuclear and/or conventional counters.

 

In the other hand, the recent US Congress’s approval of selling F-16 aircraft to India and Pakistan can be viewed as part of the US grand strategic dimension to encircle the rising Chinese might.

 

 

3-3 Encircling China

In addition to the US bilateral alliances with the five countries (Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand), the US has moved to solidify non-allied security partnerships with India, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Singapore. In each case, these security partnerships involve joint exercises, training, intelligence sharing, arms sales, military educational exchange. Indonesia has recently requalified for U.S. military assistance programs, and military-military exchanges have also commenced between the U.S. and Vietnam. In Central Asia, the U.S maintains air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in connection with the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Each of these security partnerships are significant in their own right, but taken together strongly supplement the five bilateral alliances and constitute a dense web of security and military relationships between the US and the majority of Asian nations stretching from Northeast to Southwest Asia. It is notable that these alliances and security partnerships geographically ring China. This is no accident and represents U.S. “strategic hedging” against the potential for a disruptive China.[61]

 

Zhu Feng, a professor of the International Relations Institute of the Beijing University, said the United States considers China as the biggest competitor and therefore has continuously strengthened its guard against China. Wang Xinjun, a researcher at the Strategic Research Department of China's Academy of Military Sciences, says the playing up of China's military power aims to contain China's military development as well as seek to strengthen U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific area, in order to offset China's influence in the region.[62]

 

3- 4 Challenges to US

In July 2005, Maj. Gen Zhu Chenghu of the People's Liberation Army forecast a nuclear first-strike against the U.S. if America interferes with China's plans to take Taiwan (Washington Times July 21, 2005). Gen. Zhu, a professor at China's National Defense University, told a group of foreign journalists what would happen if America intervened to save Taiwan: "We will be determined to respond. We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all cities east of Xian [in central China]. Gen. Zhu isn't the first PLA diplomat to threaten nuclear war over Taiwan. In 1995, Gen. Xiong Guangkai, now deputy chief of the general staff, told a former Pentagon official he was sure the U.S. would think twice about supporting Taiwan in a military confrontation, because Americans "cared more about losing Los Angeles" than saving Taipei.

 

Even though the Chinese remain aware of their military inferiority to the US, they have embraced a strategic doctrine based on surprise and deception aimed at allowing a weaker country to defeat a stronger adversary. In particular, Beijing is trying to develop ground-based anti-satellite weapons that would destroy US space-based communications and surveillance systems. China's aim would be to "level the technological playing field at the outset of a campaign".[63]

 

On the other hand, China’s Foreign Ministry criticised the US Quadrennial Defence Review released in early February 2006, mentioning that China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States. The Chinese Foreign Ministry claims that the Pentagon report interferes with China's internal affairs by groundlessly blaming the nation's normal national defence build-up, and that it also whips up fears of a 'Chinese military threat' and misleads public opinion.[64] Furthermore, some Chinese analysts speculate that the real intention lying behind the Pentagon document targets the impeding of China's reunification. They believe that distancing Taiwan away from the Chinese central government is the most effective means to prevent or slow down ‘China's Peaceful Rise’.

 

 

---

[1] David Shambaugh: ‘The Evolving Asian Systems: Implications for the Regional Security Architecture’, Paper presented during 8^th Waldbroel Group Meeting on Euro-Atlantic Coordination of Security Policies vis-à-vis the Asian Pacific, organized by Stiftuing Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), (Berlin, 15 December 2005), p.1

 

[2] The US has maintained the five bilateral alliances in Asia, i.e. Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

 

[3] David Shambaugh, ibid. p.4

[4] See the details of the Joint Statement, http://www.state.gov./r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm

[5]: Gilbert Rozman, ‘Northeast Asia: the Halting Path toward Regional Integration, Paper presented during 8^th Waldbroel Group Meeting on Euro-Atlantic Coordination of Security Policies vis-à-vis the A sian Pacific, organized by Stiftuing Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), (Berlin, 15 December 2005),p.2

 

[6] Gilbert Rozman, Ibid,p.6

[7] National Ministry of Defense: Defense White Paper of 2003,

[8] Evans J.R. Revere, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Evolution of the U.S.-Korea Alliance and the Future of Northeast Asia

<URLhttp://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/45576.htm (May 2, 2005)

[9] Kyong Soo Lho; U.S.-Korea Relations: A Korean Perspective,

<URL http://www.koreasociety.org/MAIN/KWarConferenceRpt/KW_Abstracts6.htm

 

[10] Chung-in Moon: ‘ROK-DPRK Engagement and US- ROK Alliance: Trade-off or Complementary’ (January 31, 2003)

 

[11] Chung-in Moon: ‘ROK-DPRK Engagement and US- ROK Alliance: Trade-off or Complementary’ (January 31, 2003)

[12] Yonhap News Agency: ‘South Korean MP reports US military attack capability,’ (October 05, 2004) <URL:http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/041005-rok-us-attack.htm [accessed 20 December 2005]

[13] Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) was replaced by Security Policy Initiative (SPI) from 3 February 2005. The SPI is for post-reconciliation ROK-US alliance. It means that the SPI is to make a blueprint of the alliance before the Korean reunification.

 

[14] 37th Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting of 2005 <URL:http://www.dod.mil/news/Oct2005/20051021_3114.html

[15] 'Strategic flexibility' new credo for USFK’, 

<URL http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2006/01/21/200601210029.asp

[16] For intelligence tools supporting forces in Korea, planners rely on satellite-derived information as well as a multitude of airborne collectors. The U.S Army permanently operates RC-7 Airborne Reconnaissance Low multi-intelligence aircraft and RC-12 Guardrail signals intelligence aircraft, and it recently deployed the Shadow-200 unmanned aircraft. The US Air Force maintains a detachment of U-2s at Osan air base, and the Army has a space-support team assigned to exploit satellite sensors. Aviation Week & Space Technology, (April 12, 2004), p.67

[17] According to Operation Plan OPLAN 5026, the US military is capable of surgically striking more than 900 crucial targets in North Korea, including Yongbyon nuclear complex.

[18] OPLAN 5026 was to compensate for OPLAN 5027 that called for the reinforcement of 690,000 US troops in case of a war breaking out on the peninsula.

 

[19] <URL http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/041005-rok-us-attack.htm

[20] 40 F-16C/D, and 23 A-10 Thunderbolt are based at Osan and Kunsan airbases. Since September 2004, the US has deployed 15 F-117 stealth fighters, and a squadron of F-15E.

 

[21] As of 2005, the number of North Korea 's combat capable aircraft is 590 and the South 540. And North Korean pilots ' flying hours per year is 20 hours, while the South counterpart is approximately reported to be 170 hours.

[22] Myeong Chin Cho: ‘Long-Term Strategy and Weapons Procurement for Korean Air Force’s Air Supremacy’, Presentation Paper, 6th Air Power Forum, Korean Air Force,(25 November 2003), p.2

 

[23] Defense officials do not want U.S. military forces to be used as a vulnerable "tripwire" in any initial attack by North Korea's army. Thousands of U.S. Army forces are deployed in camps spread close to the demilitarized zone and would be quickly overrun by invading North Korean forces or forced to make a difficult withdrawal through the urbanized Seoul area during a conflict.

 

[24] Michael O'Hanlon: ‘Why America's South Korea Plan Makes Sense’, International Herald Tribune (June 10, 2004)

 

[25] Michael O'Hanlon: ‘Strategic Implications of U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Korea ‘, Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, (June 15, 2004)

 

[26] Kathleen T. Rhem: ‘U.S. Realigning, Redeploying Military Forces in South Korea’, American Forces Press Service ( Sept. 2, 2004)

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/n09022004_2004090207.html

 

[27] The proposed defence plan was reported to President Roh Moo Hyun on 1 September. The plan includes a 27 per cent reduction in regular forces from 68,100 in 2005 to 500,000 in 2020. The army will be cut by 32 per cent to 371,000 from the current 548,000. Naval forces would slightly be reduced from 68,000 to 64,000. Janes Defence Weekly, (5 October 2005), p.7

[28] Due to the financial constraints, the KAF, in fact, reduced the number of F-X fighter from 120 to 40. It means that the current inventory of 540 fighter will be maintained to 429 in 2017, Myeong Chin Cho: ‘Long-Term Strategy and Weapons Procurement for Korean Air Force’s Air Supremacy’, Presentation Paper, 6th Air Power Forum, Korean Air Force,(25 November 2003), p.6

 

[29] Cho, Myeong Chin: Chapter 5: An Analysis on F-X Selection Process” in Restructuring of Korea’s Defense Aerospace Industry, BICC Paper, June 2003,  http://www.bicc.de/industry/paper28/content.html

[30] <URL http://www.chosun.com/international/news/200601/200601050102.html

[31] Yu Yong-won, "ROK planning to develop nuclear-powered submarines," Chosun Ilbo online edition, http://www.chosun.com, (January 26, 2004)

[32] South Korea plans to build 3,500-tonne submarines," Agence France Presse, January 26, 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

[33] Comments by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade," September 12, 2004, <URL http://www.mofat.go.kr;  "Chang In Sun, Hankryoreh Shinmun, (September 10, 2004.)

[34] Republic of Korea signed the Additional Protocol in June 1999 after coming under intense U.S. pressure in the 1990s.

[35] Ehsan Ahrari; ‘Korea Nuclear genie out of S Korean bottle’

<URL http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FI08Dg05.html (Sep 8, 2004)

 

[36] Cho, Myeong Chin; Update of North Korean Military Capability, ADIA  Assessment Report 5, ADIA Consultancy GmbH, (October, 2005)

[37] Cho, Myeong Chin; Presentation Paper at European Commission’s Security Group,  An Assessment of the Military Capability of the North Korean Armed Forces, (September 2003)

[38] Cho, Myeong Chin; ibid, p.22

 

[39] Kim Jong il’s unofficial visit to China from 10 and 18 January 2006, indicates that North Korea needs more Chinese economic and diplomatic support than before.

[40] Cho, Myeong Chin; Presentation Paper at European Commission’s Security Group,  An Assessment of the Military Capability of the North Korean Armed Forces, (September 2003), p.30

[41] Cho, Myeong Chin; Ibid, p.32

 

[42] Cho, Myeong Chin; Update of North Korean Military Capability, ADIA  Assessment Report 5, ADIA Consultancy GmbH, (October, 2005)

[43] <URL http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/66.html

[44] Cho, Myeong Chin; Update of North Korean Military Capability, ADIA Assessment Report 5, ADIA Consultancy GmbH (October, 2005)

 

[45] Cho, Myeong Chin; Update of North Korean Military Capability, ADIA  Assessment Report 5, (October, 2005)

 

[46] David Shambaugh, ibid. p.6

[47] David Shambaugh, ibid, p.7

[48] Myeong Chin Cho: ‘China’s Great Leap to Military Superpower, English version of Shindonga ( September 2005)

[49] David Shambaugh. Ibid, p.8

[50] China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by replacing older systems with newer, more survivable missiles. Over the next several years China will begin to bring into service a new road-mobile, solid-propellant, intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-31, an extended range DF-31A, and a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-2. The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, Annual Report to Congress  p.11 http://www.dod.mil/news/Oct2005/20051020_3099.html

 

[51] China's military budget for 2005 was officially $30.7 billion, (China Daily/Xinhua/CRI). It shows there is great disparity in calculating China’s defence budget.

<URL http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/08/content_518018.htm

[52] The Type 63 was originally armed with an 85 mm gun. But, it is reported to have procured a 105 mm version of the Russian Bastion gun-launched laser-guided projectile for the upgraded vehicles. Battlefield survivability can be further enhanced by installing explosive reactive armour(ERA) over the frontal arc of the new all-welded steel armour turret. Janes Defence Weekly,(10 December 2003), p.16

[53] The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, Annual Report to Congress  p.19 http://www.dod.mil/news/Oct2005/20051020_3099.html

 

[54] ADIA Consultancy GmbH: Assessment Report, No.3, (May 2005), p.1

[55] As long as Taiwan maintains an information advantage, it is impossible to ensure air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. To eliminate this advantage, the PLAAF would need airborne early-warning and control aircraft. Since the US vetoed the export of the Israeli Phalcon radar system to China, there are two available options for the PLAAF: acquisition of the Russian A-Mainstay, though its equipment needs to be significantly modernsided, and/or development and production of the locally-built AEW & C aircraft. With regard to the first option, it has been known for some time that Chinese A-50 mission crew training has been taking place in Moscow. ADIA Consultancy GmbH: Assessment Report, No.3, (May 2005), p.4

 

[56] ADIA Consultancy GmbH: Assessment Report, No.3, (May 2005), p.3

[57] Myeong Chin Cho: ‘Long-Term Strategy and Weapons Procurement for Korean Air Force’s Air Supremacy’, Presentation Paper, 6th Air Power Forum, Korean Air Force,25 November 2003

 

[58] Dipankar Banerjee: ‘China, India and Pakistan: A Nuclear Arms Race in Asia?’, Policy Brief, European Institute for Asian Studies(EIAS), (January 2004) pp.1-2

 

[59] ibid, p.2

[60] ibid, p.3

[61] See Evan Medeiros: ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability’, The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2005-06)

[62] China Daily/Xinhua, ‘China rejects Pentagon's 'threat' report’,

<URL http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/08/content_518018.htm, (updated: 2006-02-08)

[63] Myeong Chin Cho: ‘China’s Great Leap to Military Superpower, English version of Shindonga ( September 2005)

[64] China Daily/Xinhua, ‘China rejects Pentagon's 'threat' report’,

<URL http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/08/content_518018.htm, (updated: 2006-02-08)